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abstract: This excerpt intends to present 
Peter van inwagen’s theistic responses to 
the theoretical problem of whether the 
global and local arguments from evil 
succeed as philosophical arguments in 
favor of atheism. it outlines and briefly 
criticizes the defensive methodology he 
has developed, an ideal debate that pur-
ports to gauge the success or failure of 
a philosophical argument for a substan-
tive thesis. Then it presents and explores 
further the possibilities of van inwagen’s 
free-will and anti-irregularity defenses 
in the light of the Christian doctrine on 
the creation of a world in a state of jour-
neying and the human person’s special 
vocation to personal communion and 
stewardship of the world.
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atheism, problem of evil, argument from 
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theist, atheist, agnostic, philosophical 
success, vagueness, chance.
abstracto: El trabajo intenta, en primer 
lugar, presentar las respuestas de van 
inwagen a los argumentos ateos desde 
el mal (argumento global y argumento 
local); en segundo lugar, evaluar críti-
camente la metodología que ha desar-
rollado, y, por último, explorar otras 
posibilidades que su respuesta presenta 
a la luz de la doctrina cristiana sobre 
la creación de un mundo «en estado de 
vía hacia su perfección última», y la es-
pecial vocación de la persona humana 
como imagen de Dios en camino llama-
da a la comunión personal y al gobierno 
del mundo.
palabras claves: el mal, mal gratuito, 
horror, Dios, teodicea, defensa, defensa 
basada en el libre albedrío, regularidad, 
irregularidad, teísmo, ateísmo, prob-
lema del mal, argumento desde el mal, 
argumento global, argumento local, 
teísta, ateísta, agnóstico, éxito filosó-
fico, vaguedad, azar.
Something seems to be very terribly wrong with our world. The eve-
ning news is replete with reports of the day’s evils: vehicular accidents, 
terrorist attacks, domestic violence, tortures and gruesome murders, dying 
ecosystems, and the latest statistics on aiDS and starvation in third world 
countries. and of course, the wars and genocides of recent world history 
have defied any optimism about the goodness of human nature: the two 
world wars, the massacres of millions by 20th-century totalitarian regimes, 
the ethnic cleansings during the Yugoslav wars and the rwanda genocide 
in the 1990’s.
recent catastrophes, such as the may 2008 cyclone in myanmar and 
earthquake in China, claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands and sparked 
such reflections as «Did the victims deserve all this? Where is God? Is this 
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his judgment? How can an all-powerful, all-knowing, good God allow such 
horrendous suffering?»
What is evil, and why is there so much of it in our world? if there is 
an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-loving God, why are there devastating 
cyclones and earthquakes? Why are there gruesome murders, freak acci-
dents, cancers, epidemics, injustices?
in the latter part of the twentieth century, some analytic philosophers 
(e.g., J. l. mackie) charged theists of holding inconsistent beliefs,1 echoing 
the age-old questions of Epicurus and David Hume: Is God willing to prevent 
evil, but not able? Then He is impotent. Is He able, but not willing? Then He 
is malevolent. Is He both able and willing? Why then is there evil?
analytic philosophical discussions of this prima facie difficulty of 
reconciling the existence of God with the existence of evil became popular 
during the latter part of the 20th century. atheistic analytic philosophers de-
veloped so-called logical and evidential versions of the argument from evil. 
Logical arguments from evil purport to show that a mere «logical analysis» 
of the concept of «God» and the concept of «evil» can directly show the im-
possibility of God’s permitting the existence of evil. Evidential arguments 
from evil consider «the way evil is manifested in the world and try to show 
that evil constitutes strong, even compelling evidence for the non-existence 
of an adequate moral justification for an omnipotent being’s permitting evil 
to occur»2.
analytical theists, for their part, came up with their own solutions 
to the problem. These include free-will responses, epistemic defenses and 
skeptical solutions, no-best-of-all-possible-worlds defenses, natural-law 
theodicies, as well as the fairly recent felix culpa theodicy3 and the many-
universes solution4. While all these responses have something to contribute 
towards a theistic solution to the problem of evil, they also leave much to be 
desired. it is generally agreed that the free-will defense of alvin Plantinga 
has given an adequate solution to the logical problem of evil5. Nevertheless, 
1. J. l. MacKie, «Evil and omnipotence», Mind 64, no. 254 (apr. 1955): pp. 200-
212.
2. Timothy o’connor, «The Problem of Evil: introduction», in Philosophy of Reli-
gion: A Reader and Guide, ed. William lane Craig (New Brunswick, New Jersey: rut-
gers University Press, 2002), pp. 309-310.
3. See alvin PlantinGa, «Supralapsarianism, or “o Felix Culpa”», in Christian 
Faith and the Problem of Evil, ed. Peter van inwagen (Grand rapids, mich.: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2004).
4. See Donald albert tUrner, Jr., «The many-Universes Solution to the Problem of 
Evil», in The Existence of God, ed. richard m. Gale and alexander r. Pruss (aldershot: 
ashgate, 2003), pp. 143-159. 
5. See alvin PlantinGa, «The Free Will Defense», in Philosophy in America, ed. 
max Black (london: George allen and Unwin, 1965); God and Other Minds: A Study of 
the Rational Justification of Belief in God (ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967); The 
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discussions for or against the success of the evidential argument from evil 
continue. it has been recognized that for any general reason a theodicist 
proposes as morally sufficient to justify God’s non-prevention of evils, it 
doesn’t follow that this general reason suffices to morally justify God’s per-
mission of a particular instance of horrendous evil (e.g., the brutal murder 
of an innocent child).
one of the latest Christian philosophers to join the discussion is Pe-
ter van inwagen. an analytic philosopher, van inwagen is the John Cardinal 
o’Hara Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame (indiana, 
USa) and is one of the leading figures in contemporary metaphysics and 
philosophy of religion. although brought up as a Presbyterian and later as a 
Unitarian, van inwagen recounts how as a young student he went through a 
journey of faith from being an agnostic, to intellectual atheist, and eventu-
ally to being a devout churchgoing Episcopalian. He, nevertheless, quips, «i 
regard myself as a Catholic, and the anglican communion as a branch (sep-
arated from other branches by historical tragedy) of the Catholic Church 
that is mentioned as an article of belief in the Creeds»6.
The present work is an attempt to faithfully present van inwagen’s 
responses to the problem of evil – scattered in his various publications since 
the 1980’s, culminating in his 2006 book The Problem of Evil7.
Nature of Necessity (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), esp. pp. 164-195; God, Freedom, 
and Evil (Grand rapids, mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, Co., 1977), esp. pp. 
29-64. For a comprehensive study of the theistic responses of Plantinga, see Francisco 
conesa, Dios y el mal: La defensa del teísmo frente al problema del mal según Alvin 
Plantinga (Pamplona: EUNSa, 1996). among those who expressed their judgment of the 
adequacy of Plantinga’s reply to the logical argument from evil is michael l. Peterson, 
God and Evil: An Introduction to the Issues (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), 
pp. 33-43, esp. p. 41.
6. Peter van inwaGen, «Quam Dilecta», in God and the Philosophers: The Rec-
onciliation of Faith and Reason, ed. Thomas V. morris (New York: oxford University 
Press, 1994), p. 37.
7. Peter van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the 
University of St. Andrews in 2003 (oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006).
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1. the MethodoloGy oF van inwaGen’s resPonses
Van inwagen sees the problem of evil as springing from the undeni-
able fact that there is a fundamental prima facie opposition between the 
existence of a loving and all-powerful God and the existence of evil in the 
world. He acknowledges that in Western intellectual and religious history, 
the phrase «the problem of evil» now actually refers to a vague conjunction 
of many problems of evil, whose scope includes practical, existential, pas-
toral, and theoretical aspects.
1.1.  Clarifying Which «Problem of Evil» is Being addressed
Believers in God face a practical problem of evil when some terrible 
experience in their lives affects their beliefs about God and their attitudes 
towards God1. E.g., a mother whose child dies of leukemia, would ask: Can i 
continue to trust in a supposedly provident God who answers prayers – now 
that He has remained indifferent to my prayers and done nothing to save 
my son?
The radical problem of evil is the problem of how to account for 
the extreme reaches of moral depravity. in Hannah arendt, this is also the 
philosophical, psychological, anthropological problem of how to account 
for the seeming banality with which members of twentieth-century totali-
tarian regimes carry out the massacres of millions of people. it asks: how 
can it be that some people carry out horrendous crimes (e.g., mass murders) 
as though it were the most perfectly natural and banal thing to do, even a 
moral duty?
1. Ibid., pp. 5 and 152, n. 6.
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The metaphysical problem of good and evil asks: What are good and 
evil? Could there be a world that contained good but no evil – is this even 
metaphysically possible?
The theoretical problem of evil is the problem of whether or not the 
argument from evil succeeds as a philosophical argument to prove the non-
existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect God. athe-
ists allege that the argument from evil indeed constitutes strong evidence 
against belief in the existence of such a God. The theistic philosopher’s 
problem of evil is how to respond to the argument from evil in a way that 
defends the rationality of theism.
as an analytic philosopher, van inwagen chooses to address directly 
only the theoretical problem of evil.
For a philosophical discussion of the argument from evil to proceed 
in order, atheists and theists agree to attach the same meanings to the terms 
«evil» and «God». By the word «God», they both mean «an omnipotent, 
omniscient, and morally perfect Person». For the atheist of course, there is 
no actually existing being that corresponds to the concept «God» so con-
ceived. i mention in passing that a less-than-omnipotent-God (such as the 
God of process theism)2, or an impersonal God, or a morally imperfect God 
would radically alter the nature of the discussion of the argument from evil, 
so that it is no longer the same argument from evil as posed in Western 
intellectual and religious history.
By the word «evil», both theists and atheists would mean «the ab-
sence of something that ought to be present, according to a system of evalu-
ation that they both take to be objective and universal». in cases where the 
atheist brings an argument from an alleged evil (say, the evil of the suffering 
of non-human animals) – but where it is debatable whether the state of af-
fairs appealed to by the atheist indeed involves some evil (i.e., some absence 
of something that ought to be present) – the theist may respond in two ways. 
First, the theist may argue that the state of affairs appealed to by the atheist 
does not really involve a privation, the absence of something that ought to 
be present.
This is an important consideration because many issues in the prob-
lem of evil are resolved at this level. E.g., if organic death itself, or the 
2. See Charles hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (al-
bany: State University of New York Press, 1984), esp. pp. 6-27. more recent responses 
to the problem of evil that appeal to «process theism» rather than to «traditional theism» 
include David ray Griffin, Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations (albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1991); James a. Keller, Problems of Evil and the 
Power of God (aldershot: ashgate, 2007). Keller argues that the problem of evil cannot 
be answered if a theist insists on God’s omnipotence, and that only an understanding of 
God’s power as found in process theism can make possible an adequate solution and at 
the same time provide a concept of God that is religiously adequate.
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biological mechanism itself of pain, or the natural processes themselves 
of earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc., are labeled as «evils», an analytic 
theist may readily point out that these phenomena in themselves, detached 
from considerations of the individuating circumstances of the occurrence 
of each instance, may not involve absences of «goods that... ought to be 
there» (e.g. the loss of lasting existence as this organism in death does not 
involve the loss of something that... ought to be there. indefinitely prolonged 
embeddedness in an organic world for this organism does not seem to be 
something that ought to be there).
a theist, however, may also choose to respond to an argument from 
an alleged evil in a second way. Even if some argument from evil, for ex-
ample, the argument from the sufferings of beasts, can readily be refuted 
by suggesting that it is doubtful whether there is really such a thing as the 
evil of non-human animal suffering (since these creatures may not have 
self-consciousness or sense of themselves as continuing beings), a theodicist 
may dare the atheist: a theistic response can grant (at least for the sake of 
argument) that some animals indeed suffer in ways analogous to human suf-
ferings and that this state of affairs involves some evil. Van inwagen uses 
this approach. He grants that the atheist can mount distinct arguments from 
evil – one that uses human suffering resulting from free human agency and 
another that uses the sufferings of non-human animals that have nothing to 
do with free human agency.
1.2.  The Global-local Taxonomy of arguments from Evil
Van inwagen rejects the traditional taxonomy of arguments from 
evil into the logical and evidential varieties. most theistic responses (e.g., 
Plantinga’s) to the argument from evil would usually address first the logi-
cal problem of evil, and only after refuting it do they move on to address 
the evidential argument from evil. Van inwagen compares this roundabout 
approach to a defense lawyer who tries to demonstrate the innocence of his 
client by first establishing that it is at least possible «in the broadly logical 
sense» that the defendant had an evil identical twin who probably was the 
one who committed the crime, or that some extra-terrestrial beings com-
mitted the crime. after all, these stories are possible in the broadly logical 
sense, and must be taken into account.
Van inwagen prefers instead the global-local taxonomy for its direct-
ness in getting right into the real issues. The global argument argues that 
the existence of evil in general is not consistent with the existence of God. 
The local argument argues that the existence of a given particular evil (e.g., 
the brutal murder of this child: five-year-old mari luz Cortés) points to the 
non-existence of the God of theism.
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The global-local taxonomy of the argument touches both evils that 
are the result of the human abuse of freedom (i call these «lapsarian evils») 
and evils that have nothing to do with the human abuse of freedom (i call 
these «extra-lapsarian evils», of which the best candidates for examples are 
such sufferings, as there may have been, of higher-level sentient non-human 
animals before there were humans on earth)3. one must carefully note that 
this distinction (by van inwagen himself) is not exactly equivalent to the 
traditional distinction between moral and physical (or natural) evils. For 
van inwagen, some of the evils usually lumped under the rubric natural evil 
(e.g., death and destruction of innocent children from random events in na-
ture occasioned by an earthquake, tsunami, etc.) may possibly be connected 
with the human abuse of free will after all (at least the primordial abuse). 
[See the discussion of van inwagen’s free-will defense below.]
Thus, when challenged with a certain argument from evil, van inwa-
gen categorizes it as to whether the scope of the evil/s offered as evidence 
against theism is global or local, and as to whether the type of evil at issue 
is lapsarian or extra-lapsarian. Here then are four categories:
1) the global argument from lapsarian evils (e.g., human suffering in 
general; morally wrong actions in general)
2) the global argument from extra-lapsarian evils (e.g., the pains 
and/or sufferings of pre-human animals in general)
3) the local argument from lapsarian evils (e.g., the horrendous suf-
ferings of this woman as she was being brutally mutilated; the sufferings of 
this child buried alive during this earthquake)
4) the local argument from extra-lapsarian evils (e.g., the pains and/
or sufferings of this animal – e.g. a fawn as it burns to death in a forest fire 
– long before there were humans on earth).
This taxonomy by van inwagen enables him to propose a «composite 
response»4 with these features: a) a different general reason for God’s global 
permission of each of the two types of evil; b) a parallel strategy (i.e., use 
3. in van inwagen’s composite response, the angelic-corruption-of-nature defense 
of C. S. lewis (as well as the abuse of free will by non-human persons, which Plantinga 
offers as a species of the free-will defense that is possible in the broadly logical sense) is 
considered as an alternative explanation for the extra-lapsarian evil of the sufferings of 
beasts, especially those that existed long before there were humans. Thus, obviously, in 
van inwagen’s schema, the «lapse» referred to in lapsarian evils is the human lapse in 
the good use of freedom, not any supposed angelic rejection to love God. «lapse» seems 
to be the right word to use indeed since a «lapse» connotes the possibility of a «getting 
back on the right track» on the part of the one who lapsed. Human beings are, of course, 
forgivable, redeemable and reconcilable creatures capable of «getting back on track» 
through God’s plan of redemption and their free cooperation. angels, on the other hand, 
are traditionally described as capable only of one radical and irrevocable choice to love 
or reject God.
4. Cfr. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 113.
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of arguments that have similar logical structures) for showing the failure of 
local arguments using either kind of evil.
The methodology of van inwagen’s «composite response» to the 
atheistic challenge from evil will now be examined.
1.3.  The ideal-Debate Test of a Philosophical argument
Despite Plantinga’s technical definitions of defense and theodicy5, 
van inwagen attaches some special conceptual features to «theodicy» in 
his 1988 essay6. a theistic response to the argument from evil can still be 
called a «theodicy» if it claims plausibility, more than just «possibility in 
the broadly logical sense», even if it lays no claim to knowing God’s actual 
purposes.
in the 2003 Gifford lectures (published as The Problem of Evil in 
2006), van inwagen decides to use Plantinga’s technical distinctions7. as in 
the 1988 essay, he does not claim to know God’s actual purposes, and, of 
course, that alone is reason enough for him to call his 2003/2006 project a 
composite «defense» in Plantinga’s sense. The claims van inwagen makes 
for his theistic responses, whether he calls them a «theodicy» or a «de-
fense», include:
1) «Epistemic possibility», i.e., «plausibility», or, in the expression 
repeatedly used (in its various forms) by van inwagen, «truth-for-all-any-
one-knows»8.
2) Sufficiency, not comprehensiveness, in explaining God’s reasons 
for allowing evil.
3) Use of stories taken from Christian revelation9.
4 Consonance with the well-known facts of science and history10.
 5. in Plantinga’s use of these terms – at least in the 1970’s – a defense only claims 
to tell us some logically possible reasons for God’s allowing the existence of evils. a 
theodicy claims true knowledge of God’s actual reasons for allowing the existence of 
evils. 
 6. Peter van inwaGen, «The magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil: a 
Theodicy», in God, Knowledge, and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology, by Pe-
ter van inwagen (ithaca and london: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 96-122; first 
published in Philosophical Topics 16, no. 2 (1988): pp. 161-187. Subsequent page cita-
tions are from the 1995 book.
 7. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 65.
 8. van inwaGen, «The magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil: a Theod-
icy», pp. 96-98.
 9. Ibid.
10. Peter van inwaGen, «The argument from Evil», in Christian Faith and the 
Problem of Evil (Grand rapids, mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2004), 
p. 68.
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For van inwagen a theodicy may indeed be verbally identical with a 
defense11. as he reflects on some data from Christian revelation, he remarks 
that those who do not share his allegiance to these data may, of course, 
just call his project a «defense» (in Plantinga’s sense), if they want, and 
still give a fair hearing to all the contents of the essay. and so, when van 
inwagen’s work on the problem of evil is taken as a response to atheists, it 
appears to be modest in its aims and in its strategy: it merely tries to show 
that the argument from evil fails as a philosophical argument for atheism. 
[of course, a Christian theist who hears van inwagen’s response would see 
that the propositions van inwagen brings before atheists as merely «true for 
all anyone knows» are in fact propositions whose truth is guaranteed by a 
source other than the natural light of human reason alone (e.g., faith in the 
truth of divine revelation).]
To show that the argument from evil fails as a philosophical argu-
ment, van inwagen asks: When can we say that a philosophical argument for 
a substantive thesis (e.g., «God does not exist»; «God exists») is a success? 
and when can we say that it is a failure? He proposes the following criteria 
for philosophical success: An argument for p is a success just in the case 
that it can be used, under ideal circumstances, to convert an audience of 
ideal agnostics (i.e., agnostics in regard to p) to belief in p – in the presence 
of an ideal opponent of p, who tries to employ every rational means pos-
sible at every stage of the debate to keep the audience from being converted 
to p12.
and so, van inwagen presents his response to the problem of evil in 
the context of an imaginary debate, conducted under ideal conditions. He 
puts the discussion in the mouth of two imaginary characters: an ideal The-
ist (male) and an ideal atheist (female) debating before an ideal audience of 
agnostics. They are «ideal» not only in the sense of «imaginary», but also in 
the sense that they are supposed to possess the highest possible intelligence, 
the highest possible degree of philosophical and logical acumen, and are 
intellectually honest when evaluating the relevant arguments13. in the case 
of the ideal agnostics, they are, moreover, supposed to be ideally neutral, 
that is, they are supposed not to have the slightest predilection, emotional 
or otherwise, for either theism or atheism. and yet, they are supposed to be 
very eager to come to know the truth of the matter14.
The debate follows the forensic model. Theism itself is under trial – ac-
cused of inconsistency, for holding the co-existence of God and vast amounts 
11. van inwaGen, «The argument from Evil», p. 62; van inwagen, The Problem of 
Evil, p. 7.
12. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, pp. 45 and 47.
13. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
14. Ibid., pp. 44 and 47.
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of evil. The prosecutor is the atheist, and therefore she has the burden of 
proof. She must convince the ideal neutral audience of agnostics, serving as 
jurors, that atheism is true beyond reasonable doubt. The ideal Theist acts as 
a defense lawyer for theism. The defense counsel needs only to come up with 
a story, true-for-all-anyone-knows, in which the evidence (i.e., the existence 
of evils) can be shown to be consistent with the innocence of the accused, i.e., 
the truth and consistency of theism.
The imaginary characters are supposed to take all the time they need 
to hear and to refute each other’s arguments. at the end of the imaginary 
debate – when «nothing more can be said», says van inwagen – the ideal 
audience of neutral agnostics will then give their verdict: they are either 
unanimously convinced by atheist’s argument from evil and now are con-
verted to atheism, or they unanimously find the allegations contained in the 
argument from evil as «not beyond reasonable doubt» and therefore would 
remain as agnostics15.
Predictably, of course, van inwagen’s imaginary agnostics, after 
hearing the defense, are not converted to atheism by the argument from evil. 
and so, van inwagen the real-life philosopher in effect tells us that indeed 
the argument from evil fails as a philosophical argument for atheism.
Some complaints have been raised against van inwagen’s methodo-
logy and criterion of philosophical success16. Some question the plausibility 
of van inwagen’s supposition that ideal proponents, as well as ideal agnos-
tics with no predilection whatsoever, are the best indicators for the success 
of an argument17. it also seems that when a creator of an ideal debate says 
that his ideal characters are «of the highest possible intelligence» and there-
fore «ideal» in that sense, he cannot just leave it at that. Unless the theistic 
creator of an ideal debate specifies the background knowledge and beliefs 
of his imaginary agnostics, as well as the degree of credence («probable», 
«highly probable», «totally devoid of any significant probability of being 
true», etc.) they assign to various propositions, theories, etc., it would be 
15. Ibid., p. 45.
16. Cfr., for example, David alexander, «Three Consequences of van inwagen’s 
account of Philosophical Success», a panel discussion paper at the Second annual Phi-
losophy of religion Conference at Baylor University, Waco, Texas in 2007, retrieved 15 
may 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.
php/41351. pdf. See also Daniel m. johnson, «a Counterexample to van inwagen’s Cri-
terion for the Success and Failure of Philosophical arguments», a panel discussion paper 
delivered at the Second annual Philosophy of religion Conference at Baylor University, 
Waco, Texas in 2007, retrieved 15 may 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://www.
baylor.edu/content/services/ document.php/40622.pdf, pp. 2-4.
17. Cfr. William hasKer, «The Problem of Evil», a review of Peter van inwagen’s 
The Problem of Evil, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2007-03-12), retrieved 15 
may 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=9064.
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hard for the real-life readers of the ideal debate to have some objective ba-
sis for affirming that indeed, given the arguments the creator puts into the 
mouth of his imaginary defender, there’s no other way for the verdict to be 
(in ideal conditions) but as he says it would be: a unanimous one in favor of 
the defense18.
Having said the above, i’d still say that van inwagen’s imaginary 
debate is an engaging literary device. it at least clarifies that when athe-
ists accuse theism of inconsistency by brandishing the argument from 
evil, they are the ones who have the burden of proof. moreover, one need 
not suppose with van inwagen that ideal agnostics (if they are possible at 
all) would always be unanimous in their verdict, or that there will ever 
come a point (so long as there are still philosophers searching for the 
truth) when nothing more can be said on a philosophical issue. it just 
might be advisable that each reader of van inwagen’s ideal debate should 
imagine himself sitting as one of the jurors: after hearing the discus-
sions van inwagen puts into the mouth of his ideal characters, how would 
i (as a juror) judge the argument from evil? after all, what ultimately 
matters is not what a bunch of ideal agnostics say about an argument (or 
better said, what a theistic creator of an ideal debate would say that his 
ideal agnostics would say in regard to a philosophical argument); what 
ultimately matters is what I say as a rationally thinking person in regard 
to a philosophical problem.
Van inwagen thinks there is no philosophical argument that is a 
success according to his criterion. The argument from evil, like other 
philosophical arguments, will thus, predictably, be shown to be a failure. it 
doesn’t have the power to convert an audience of ideal agnostics to atheism 
even after the best efforts of an ideal atheist. Van inwagen attempts to show 
how that is so.
We will now reconstruct, first, the free-will defense that van inwa-
gen especially sets in the methodological context of an imaginary debate 
based on the forensic model. although he doesn’t present his anti-irregu-
larity defense in the context of this ideal debate, van inwagen affirms that 
the verdict of «genuinely neutral agnostics» remains to be his standard for 
evaluating the argument from the sufferings of beasts, as well as the argu-
ments in his defenses19.
18. Cfr. richard swinbUrne, Book review of Peter van inwagen’s The Problem 
of Evil, in Mind 116, no. 463 (July 2007): p. 791. See also Kenny boyce and Justin 
Mcbrayer, «Van inwagen on the Problem of Evil: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly», a 
panel discussion paper presented at the Second annual Philosophy of religion Confer-
ence at Baylor University, Waco, Texas, in 2007, retrieved 15 may 2008 from the World 
Wide Web: http://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.php/ 41162.pdf.
19. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 113.
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First, atheist, who has the burden of proof at this stage, lays an argu-
ment from evil in support of her atheistic thesis.
Secondly, Theist, the defense debater at this point, responds by cast-
ing doubt on at least one premise of the argument from evil. Theist is not 
required to show that the argument is false, but only that something in it 
is doubtful. Neither is he required to weaken atheist’s allegiance to her 
own premises, for what matters is the agnostic audience’s acceptance or 
non-acceptance of those premises. The defender may tell «just-so stories»20 
where both God and evils of the kinds and amounts found in the actual 
world co-exist.
Thirdly, atheist presents a rejoinder to the doubt-casting statement 
of the defense by pointing out some flaws in Theist’s stories. This rejoinder 
takes the form of a reformulation of the original argument in such a way that 
now it escapes the first criticism of Theist.
Fourthly, Theist replies to the rejoinder of atheist. Steps Three and 
Four are repeated for as long as one of the debaters still has something to 
say.
2.  the Free-will deFense aGainst the Global arGUMent FroM evil
What follows is a reconstruction in propositional form of the initial 
speeches of van inwagen’s imaginary debaters.
2.1. The Global argument from Evil
atheist’s first speech contains the initial presentation of the global 
argument from evil:
(1)  There are evils in the actual world where free human beings find 
themselves21.
(2)  God, if He exists, is omnipotent, omniscient (or at least knows 
about the evils of the world that free human beings know about), 
and morally perfect.
20. van inwaGen, «The magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil: a Theod-
icy», p. 106, n. 7; quoting Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth 
Wanting (Cambridge: m.i.T. Press, 1980), p. 38.
21. The addition of the adjective «free» to «human beings» is deliberately antici-
pated here (for our expository purposes), even if it does not yet appear in atheist’s First 
Speech. atheist, of course, doesn’t have any problem with this qualification and she in 
fact agrees, in her second speech, that human beings in the actual world are free.
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(3)  The existence of all evils in the actual world where free human 
beings find themselves is not consistent with the existence of the 
omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect God22.
(4)  Therefore, since there are evils in the actual world where free 
human beings find themselves, no omnipotent, omniscient, and 
morally perfect God exists.
Atheist’s Proof for Proposition (3)
(5)  All the evils in the actual world where free human beings find 
themselves are evils that an omnipotent, omniscient, and mor-
ally perfect God, if He exists, is able to prevent, knows about, 
and wants to prevent, without thereby allowing the occurrence 
of an evil equally bad or worse, or losing a greater good.
(6)  in a created world where there are free beings, God, if He exists, 
can ensure that there would be no evils23.
(7)  Hence, if there had been an omnipotent, omniscient, and mor-
ally perfect God, there wouldn’t have been any evil in the actual 
world where free human beings find themselves.
Van inwagen’s free-will defense proposes the exact contradictory 
of both atheist’s Premise (5) and atheist’s Premise (6), as will be shown 
shortly. God cannot do the things that atheist’s Premises (5) and (6) say He 
can. The bulk of the defense would, of course, be in presenting arguments 
why such things are intrinsically impossible.
Consequently, if Premises (5) and (6) can be shown to be «false, for 
all anyone knows», so will atheist’s Premise (3). atheist’s Premise (3) may 
well be false because its contradiction is possibly true, namely, «The exis-
tence of all evils in the actual world where free human beings find them-
selves is not inconsistent with the existence of the omnipotent, omniscient, 
and morally perfect God».
2.2.  The Free-Will Defense against the Global argument
Supplied with the implicit premises, the free-will defense that van 
inwagen puts in the mouth of his imaginary Theist is reconstructed as fol-
lows:
22. We may note that although van inwagen expressly prefers the global-local to the 
logical-evidential taxonomy, he nevertheless begins his ideal debate between atheist and 
Theist with some points first made in discussions of the logical problem, but he does so not 
under the rubric «the logical problem of evil». See van inwagen, The Problem of Evil, p. 68.
23. one way to try to prove this premise might be by appealing to the compatibilist 
theory of free will, as van inwagen acknowledges. See Peter van inwagen, An Essay on 
Free Will (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 106-152.
 EVil aND aBoUNDiNG loVE 297
2.2.1.  The Simple Form of the Free-Will Defense
1) an indispensable part of the goodness of this world is the exis-
tence of intelligent beings which are capable of abstract thinking, love, and 
free choice between contemplated courses of action.
2) Creaturely free will is a necessary condition for creaturely love 
and creaturely free choice24.
3) a logically necessary condition for creaturely freedom is non-de-
termination by God, i.e., God cannot give a creature a free choice between 
x (doing good) and y (doing evil), and ensure that the creature would choose 
x rather than y, for this is metaphysically impossible25.
4) God, granted that He exists, created free intelligent beings and 
made sure that He did not determine them in regard to their free acts.
5) Some intelligent beings misused their freedom and produced a 
certain amount of evil and suffering in the actual world.
The actual commission of moral evils has never been a part of God’s 
eternal plan. moreover, if the world could have been much worse than it 
actually is, then it is at least possible that God does everything His om-
nipotence could do to increase the probability that His free creatures would 
freely choose to do the good. However – granted that the incompatibilist 
theory of free will is true – despite all that omnipotence can do, the free 
creature remains in a very real sense actually able to turn against God, 
against his fellow humans, against the world, and against his own reason 
and self-integrity. But God does not eliminate creaturely freedom because 
of its necessity in making possible the immensely great good of the creature 
called out of nothingness to come to love God (and his fellow creatures and 
himself in God).
Van inwagen addresses the well-known fundamental objections 
against most free-will defenses. These objections concern the nature of 
free will itself. They include the question on the supposed compatibility of 
free will with determinism, the supposed truth of some counterfactuals of 
creaturely freedom (what is sometimes called «God’s middle knowledge»), 
and the supposed incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and creaturely 
freedom.
24. The qualification «creaturely» is a careful addition to van inwagen’s «free will is 
necessary for love», in anticipation of what van inwagen himself considers, namely, the 
objection that says the divine persons of the Trinity (in Christian Theism) are not free to 
love or not to love one another (for they necessarily love each other), and that therefore 
the thesis that «free will is necessary for love» is not necessarily true. See van inwagen’s 
response to this objection in The Problem of Evil, pp. 165-167, n. 10 to lecture 5.
25. one way to try to prove this premise might be by appealing to the incompatibilist 
theory of free will. See van inwagen’s «Three arguments for incompatibilism» in his An 
Essay on Free Will (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 55-105.
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at this point, one can clearly see the ingenuity of van inwagen’s 
preferred methodological context. it wouldn’t matter so much in an ideal 
debate that both incompatibilism and compatibilism, for example, are prob-
able theories of free-will, with each account possessing good arguments 
supporting it. The ideal atheist cannot just dismiss before the ideal agnos-
tics the free-will story as false on the ground that it is objectionable, given 
her compatibilist account of free will. Since she has the burden of proof, 
she must demonstrate before the agnostics that compatibilism is the correct 
theory, and that incompatibilism is false. Unfortunately for the atheist, com-
patibilism is not yet known to possess a decisive philosophical argument 
such that anyone hearing it would be converted to it. a compatibilist theory 
of free will is just one account of free will, and the incompatibilist theory 
is another. arguments can be offered in support of both sides, but both fall 
short of coming up with a convincing proof26.
2.2.2. The Expanded Free-Will Defense
Van inwagen next addresses atheist’s expected rejoinder: isn’t it the 
case that many of the horrendous evils in the world obviously don’t have 
anything to do with the abuse of freedom by human beings: cancer, plagues 
and epidemics, earthquakes, tsunamis, and cyclones?
in what he calls his «expanded free-will defense», van inwagen care-
fully notes that many of the things that the atheist calls «evils» are not by 
themselves evils. For example, earthquakes and cyclones are but normal 
processes in the natural world; what might be called «evil» – in fact, what 
are usually called «natural evils» – are the agonizing deaths and destruc-
tions brought about by the random events that are occasioned by these pro-
cesses in nature, and given the fact that the actual world has stable natural 
26. in many places, van inwagen acknowledges this point. He gives three arguments 
for incompatibilism as well as three arguments for compatibilism in his An Essay on Free 
Will, pp. 55-105 and 106-152. See also van inwaGen, «Compatibilism and the Burden of 
Proof», Analysis 40, no. 2 (mar. 1980): pp. 98-100, and richard Foley, «reply to van 
inwagen», Analysis 40, no. 2 (mar. 1980): pp. 101-103. See also van inwaGen, «on Two 
arguments for Compatibilism», Analysis 45, no. 3 (June 1985): pp. 161-163; «When is 
the Will Free?» Philosophical Perspectives 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory 
(1989): pp. 399-422; «The mystery of metaphysical Freedom», in Metaphysics: The Big 
Questions, ed. Peter van inwagen and Dean W. zimmerman (malden, ma: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1998), pp. 365-374; «moral responsibility, Determinism, and the ability to 
Do otherwise», The Journal of Ethics 3 (1999): pp. 341-350; «Free Will remains a mys-
tery», Philosophical Perspectives 14: Action and Freedom (2000): pp. 1-19; Peter van 
inwagen, «How to Think about the Problem of Free Will», retrieved 15 may 2008 from 
the World Wide Web: http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/all/profiles/van-inwagen-peter/ 
documents/HowThinkFW.doc [to appear in The Journal of Ethics].
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laws. «random events in nature» would be, for example, a particular heavy 
object falling at a particular place at a particular time on the occasion of 
a particular earthquake, or a particular tree being uprooted and smashing 
on the ground at a particular place at a particular time on the occasion of a 
particular gust of wind.
Van inwagen offers this defense story as «true for all anyone 
knows»: God created the first human beings in an original state of holi-
ness and justice. in this original state of holiness and justice, the first 
human beings enjoyed some sort of preternatural powers: they were able 
to avoid getting in the way of random events in nature – which they knew 
about in advance – and thus they were able to avoid getting harmed by 
these events. When the first humans abused their freedom, the effects 
included: loss of the preternatural gifts, susceptibility to being destroyed 
by random events in nature; suffering when they, in fact, were not able to 
escape from these random events; a frame of mind that tends to do moral 
evil. These effects were inherited by subsequent generations. all the evils 
and sufferings that human beings suffered from them on until now can 
be traced back to that aboriginal abuse of free will in two ways: 1) moral 
evils subsequently committed – and which brought so much evil and suf-
fering both to the perpetrator and the victim – became all the easier to 
commit because of the acquired frame of mind that now tends to do evil. 
2) in man’s fallen state, where there are no more preternatural powers, 
escaping destruction by the random events occasioned by nature’s normal 
processes became all the more difficult.
Thus, in van inwagen’s defense, there is a sense in which at least a 
good part of human suffering after the alleged primordial abuse of freedom 
can still be traced back as a consequence of the abuse of freedom after all 
– at least of that primordial abuse of freedom, one of whose natural con-
sequences was separation from God, loss of the preternatural gifts, and an 
inherited tendency to do what one ought not to do.
Van inwagen’s expanded free-will defense again draws from some 
data from Christian revelation and adds the following propositions as «true 
for all anyone knows»:
1) after human beings abused their freedom, God set into operation 
an atonement plan (a plan of «at-one-ment») designed to restore separated 
human beings to union with Him.
2) a necessary condition for the atonement plan to succeed is that 
human beings are made aware of the bad situation of their state of separa-
tion and that they would once more freely decide to love God the second 
time around.
3) a necessary condition for human beings to be aware of the bad 
situation of their state of separation is that God should leave in place (i.e., 
not prevent) a certain amount of evil in the actual world.
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4) Total miraculous cancellation by God of all the natural conse-
quences of the abuse of free will (i.e., all the evils and sufferings of human 
beings) would be: deception on the part of God to human beings in regard 
to their true miserable state of separation from Him. moreover, cancellation 
of all human sufferings would remove the only motivation fallen human 
beings have for turning back to God27.
5) Therefore, given that human beings abused their freedom, God is 
justified in not preventing at least some amount of evil (e.g., the sufferings 
naturally consequent upon the human abuse of freedom) in order to provide 
a necessary – though definitely insufficient (since it awaits the free human 
response) – condition for the success of the atonement.
Van inwagen again adds: For all anyone knows – since it is, after 
all, possible to imagine that the actual world could have been much worse 
than it is – it is at least possible that God is continually preventing a great 
number of the evils that would have naturally obtained without His special 
intervention.
Van inwagen ends his imaginary Theist’s expanded free-will defense 
by making the following claims:
(6)  God indeed will bring His plan of atonement («at-one-ment», 
i.e., union of creatures with God) to fruition in due time28.
(7)  «When God’s plan of atonement comes to fruition, there 
will never again be undeserved suffering or any other sort of 
evil»29.
(8)  «if there is still suffering, it will be merited: the suffering of 
those who refuse to cooperate with God’s great rescue opera-
tion and are allowed by him to exist forever in a state of elected 
ruin – those who, in a word, are in Hell».
(9)  When God’s plan of atonement comes to fruition, those human 
beings who loved God, i.e., freely chose to be reunited with 
27. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 88; van inwagen, «The magnitude, Dura-
tion, and Distribution of Evil: a Theodicy», p. 113.
28. in a context where a theodicy need not limit itself to the claims of «restricted 
theism» but may legitimately make use of claims taken from «expanded theism», such 
as Christian truth claims deduced from revelation, the claim that «God brings His plan of 
atonement to fruition in due time» is certainly more than just «logical in the broadly logi-
cal sense». it has the force of being held to be true by theists in a certain tradition, namely, 
Christianity. indeed the holding of this proposition to be true is even shared by theists of 
the two other monotheistic religions (islam and Judaism). The three monotheistic tradi-
tions would of course propose divergent propositions as regards the details of how this 
plan of atonement is being brought to fruition by God. But all three traditions believe it 
to be true that a plan of atonement whereby creatures can be reunited with God is one of 
those things that God does for His people.
29. van inwaGen, «The magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil: a Theod-
icy», p. 102. Cfr. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 89.
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Him by freely cooperating in His rescue operation, will enjoy 
happiness forever in a state of elected union with God called 
Heaven30.
(10)  The expected value of allowing all the total number of evils 
in the actual world until the final completion of God’s plan of 
atonement, given that God indeed provides such a completion 
(an eternity of happiness in a communion of love with God), is 
positive31.
(11)  Current knowledge of human pre-history and evolution does 
not disprove any of the claims in the expanded free-will de-
fense32.
Van inwagen concludes that since the expanded free-will defense is 
a story that is possible, reasonable, and one that doesn’t give anybody rea-
son to reject the whole of it or even any part of it on scientific grounds, the 
ideal audience of impartial agnostics can indeed be reasonably imagined 
to give the verdict he believes they would: a unanimous one in favor of the 
defense.
However, the ideal atheist can still raise the objections from the 
great amounts33 and horrendous varieties of evil there are in the actual 
world.
We now turn to the rest of van inwagen’s imaginary debate.
3.  the Free-will deFense aGainst the local arGUMent FroM evil
after the first round of discussions, atheist grants that the expanded 
free-will defense has shown that God could not have totally done away with 
every evil there is in the actual world. atheist even grants that the inability 
of God to prevent the abuse of free will («inability», i.e., in the relative 
sense that God also decides to let free creatures significantly exercise their 
freedom) may well imply, granted that Theist’s free-will story is true, either 
30. van inwaGen, «The magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil: a Theod-
icy», pp. 112-113. Cfr. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 89.
31. Using the language of one of Swinburne’s four conditions that must be fulfilled 
for God to be justified in allowing an evil, this formulation expresses van inwagen’s 
rather poetic rendition of the same thought: «[T]his present darkness, “the age of evil”, 
will eventually be remembered as a brief flicker at the beginning of human history. Every 
evil done by the wicked to the innocent will have been avenged, and every tear will have 
been wiped away». van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 89; van inwagen, «The mag-
nitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil: a Theodicy», p. 102.
32. Cfr. van inwaGen, «Quam Dilecta», pp. 50-55.
33. Cfr. van inwaGen, «The argument from Evil», pp. 64 and 68; van inwagen, The 
Problem of Evil, p. 73.
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the inability of God to prevent «natural evils» in general, or God’s having 
morally sufficient reasons for allowing these evils in general34. Thus the 
following have been shown to be not inconsistent with the existence of an 
omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect God:
–  the general scenario where human beings freely do evil, separate 
themselves from God, are without the protection of preternatu-
ral powers, and are vulnerable to potentially destructive random 
events occasioned by the normal processes in nature;
–  the general scenario where human beings suffer from the evil con-
sequences of events caused by the abuse of free-will.
as logical consequence of the above, the expanded free-will de-
fense has shown that the following are not inconsistent with the existence 
of God:
–  the existence in general of certain kinds of «natural evils». E.g., 
the wounding, psychological traumatizing, maiming or killing of 
people by random events (e.g., falling debris, falling boulder) dur-
ing such natural phenomena as earthquakes and cyclones;
–  the existence in general of certain kinds of moral evils, as well as 
their specific evil effects. E.g., suffering caused by petty theft, a 
slap, slander, etc.;
–  the existence in general of specifically horrendous evils – «hor-
rors» in general, for example – where «horrors» simply mean 
«very bad events»35 whether brought about directly by free human 
agency or not. one of the consequences of their separation from 
God is that humans now live in a world in which horrors happen at 
random. most often, the distribution of horrors has nothing to do at 
all with the moral state of the subjects (e.g., birth of a baby without 
limbs, rape and murder of little children).
34. atheist’s grant here about God’s possible inability to prevent «natural evils» 
should be understood in just the general sense adduced by Theist, namely, that it’s pos-
sible that at least some of the sufferings endured by humans after the primordial abuse 
of free will (e.g., deaths during earthquakes) are due to the fact that they no longer enjoy 
preternatural powers that would have warned them of potentially harmful random events 
occasioned by nature’s normal processes. atheist grants, for now, that a morally perfect 
omnipotent God may indeed have a morally sufficient reason for allowing the existence 
of such examples of «natural evil», namely, that God had to leave in place some of the 
evil consequences of the abuse of free will in order to at least provide a necessary (though 
of course insufficient) condition for the atonement. atheist does not grant a point that 
is not even brought out by Theist yet, namely, natural evil involving pre-lapse animal 
suffering.
35. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 95.
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3.1. The local argument from Evil
The local argument from evil launches an attack making use of a 
particular instance of gratuitous horror that actually took place in the past, 
say, this particular gratuitous horror: the brutal murder of five-year old 
mari luz Cortés near the port of Huelva, Spain in January 2008 (henceforth 
referred to as «the murder of mari luz»36).
Atheist’s Main Argument
(13)  The murder of mari luz was a gratuitous horror.
(14)  if the murder of mari luz had been prevented by God from 
occurring (given that an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally 
perfect God exists from all eternity), the world would be no 
worse than it is.
(15)  if the world would be no worse than it is by an omnipotent 
God’s prevention of the murder of mari luz, He would have 
prevented its occurrence if He was able to.
(16)  if an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect God exists 
from all eternity, He was able to prevent the murder of mari 
luz from occurring, and able to do so in a way that would have 
left the world otherwise much as it is.
(17)  The murder of mari luz in fact occurred.
(18)  Therefore, since this instance of a clearly gratuitous horror was 
not prevented, no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect 
God exists from all eternity.
Atheist’s Support for Her Proposition (14)
(19)  The world would be no worse than it is by the prevention of the 
murder of mari luz because:
 (19a)  God’s plan to have a world where human beings signifi-
cantly exercise their freedom would not have been frus-
trated by the removal of the horror that was the murder 
of mari luz. if this single incident was removed from the 
several-thousand-year history of free human beings, the 
36. This example is chosen for this study. Both van inwagen and marilyn adams 
make use of a true story that was reported in the press in the 1980’s about a woman who 
was attacked by a man in an isolated place sometime in the 1980’s. The man chopped off 
her arms with an ax, raped her, and left her to die. The woman, however, survived and 
was severely traumatized for life. Van inwagen refers to this whole incident as «the mu-
tilation». See The Problem of Evil, pp. 97-98 and 168, n. 1 of lecture 6. See also adaMs, 
«Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God», Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
supplementary volume 63 (1989): pp. 297-310; reprinted in revised form in The Problem 
of Evil, ed. marilyn mcCord adams and robert merrihew adams (oxford: oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1990), pp. 209-221.
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world would be very much as it is: Human beings are still 
significantly free.
 (19b)  God’s plan of atonement will not be frustrated just because 
the murder of mari luz did not occur. The accomplishment 
of God’s plan of atonement would not even be significantly 
affected by the prevention of the murder of mari luz.
Atheist’s Support for Her Proposition (15)
(20)  an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect God, if He 
exists, would have prevented the horror that was the murder 
of mari luz unless there was some greater good that only the 
murder of mari luz could make possible, or unless there was 
an equally bad or worse evil that only the murder of mari luz 
could prevent.
(21)  There was no greater good that only the murder of mari luz 
could make possible. all the proposed goods are either ones that 
can be made possible and are even achievable by other, less evil 
means than the murder of mari luz, or ones that do not neces-
sarily outweigh the horror of the murder of mari luz, or both.
(22)  There was no evil equally bad or worse that only the murder 
of mari luz could prevent. all the proposed evils are either 
ones that can be prevented by the occurrence of other, less evil 
means than the murder of mari luz, or ones that are not neces-
sarily equal or worse evils than the murder itself.
Atheist’s Support for Her Proposition (16)
(23)  There are ways available to an omnipotent, omniscient, and 
morally perfect God by which He could have brought about the 
prevention of the murder and left the world much as it is. For 
example, God, if He exists, could have brought it about that the 
would-be murderer suffered a broken ankle an hour before the 
murder, or that mari luz did not go out of the house to buy a 
packet of crisps on that fatal day.
(24)  if the omnipotent God had employed these ways, He would 
have prevented the murder of mari luz and left the world much 
as it is: He would still have human beings exercising their free-
dom significantly, and He wouldn’t be putting the atonement 
in danger of being frustrated.
3.2.  The Free-Will Defense against the local argument
many theists would reply to the local argument by casting doubt 
on Premise (13) of the Argument from This Particular Gratuitous Horror: 
«The murder of mari luz was a gratuitous horror».
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This is a possible approach and it certainly proposes a scenario 
whereby atheist’s premises can be false. it offers the following simple de-
fense of theism: «For all anyone knows, the world (considered under the 
aspect of eternity) is a better place for containing the [murder]... God has 
brought, or will at some future time bring, some great good out of the [mur-
der], a good that outweighs it, or else has employed the [murder] as a means 
to the prevention of some even greater evil... [F]or all anyone knows, the 
great good achieved or the great evil prevented could not have been, respec-
tively, achieved or prevented, even by an omnipotent being, in any other way 
than by some means that involved the [murder] or some other horror at least 
as bad as the [murder]»37.
if the murder of mari luz has at least one of these characteristics 
– necessity in the prevention of an evil equally bad or worse, or necessity 
in making possible the achievement of some greater good – then it was not 
in fact a gratuitous horror. Both atheist and Theist may agree that it was 
a horror, but while atheist says it was a gratuitous horror, the Theist using 
this approach says it was not a gratuitous horror. Premise (13) of the local 
argument from This Particular Gratuitous Horror is squarely contradicted. 
Peterson calls this theistic approach a very traditional one: the theist does 
not make a commitment towards believing in the existence of pointless 
evils38.
Skeptical theists, of course, such as Wykstra and alston would find 
it enough for refuting the local argument to simply point out the incapac-
ity of the human cognitive condition to comprehend God’s purposes at all 
times39. No human is in the position to say that a particular horror proposed 
as gratuitous is not in fact the necessary means (or a necessary part of the 
necessary means) to achieve a greater good or avoid an evil at least as bad. 
Consequently, skeptical theists conclude that the argument from gratuitous 
evil cannot even get past the initial premise on the gratuitousness of some 
horrors, or past the initial premise on the gratuitousness of this particular 
horror.
37. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 98.
38. Peterson, God and Evil: An Introduction to the Issues, p. 30.
39. See, for example, Stephen J. Wykstra, «The Humean obstacle to Evidential ar-
guments from Suffering: on avoiding the Evils of “appearance”», International Journal 
for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984): pp. 73-93; «rowe’s Noseeum arguments from 
Evil», in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington: 
indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 126-150. See also William P. alston, «The induc-
tive argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition», in Philosophical Per-
spectives 5: Philosophy of Religion (atascadero: ridgeview, 1991), pp. 29-67; «Some 
(Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential arguments from Evil», in The Evidential 
Argument from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington: indiana University Press, 
1996), pp. 311-332.
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While he acknowledges the possibility of skeptical solutions, van 
inwagen moves on to another approach, one that grants (at least for the sake 
of argument) the existence of gratuitous horrors. Van inwagen’s response 
admits, and even calls «plausible», the following premise:
(25) There has been, in the history of the world, at least one gratu-
itous horror such that if it had not occurred, the world would be no worse 
than it is40.
Van inwagen’s response attempts to cast reasonable doubt rather on 
the following premise of atheist:
Proposition (15) of the Argument from the Gratuitousness of This 
Particular Horror: «if the world would be no worse than it is by an omnipo-
tent God’s prevention of the murder of mari luz, He would have prevented 
its occurrence if He was able to».
3.2.1.  Refutation of the Moral Principle Appealed to by Atheists
The first step is exposing the implied presupposition behind atheist’s 
Premise (15), namely, the supposition that the following proposition is a basic 
moral principle that applies to God’s moral situation in regard to evils:
(SP) if one is in a position to prevent some evil, one should not al-
low that evil to occur – not unless allowing it to occur would result in some 
good that would outweigh it or preventing it would result in some other evil 
at least as bad.
The above proposition has been called the «standard position on 
evil» (SP)41. This is the same moral principle rowe describes as «basic» 
and supposed to be shared by both theists and non-theists42. anyone who 
describes the above proposition as «a basic moral principle» is in effect 
claiming that such a proposition is necessarily correct43, i.e., correct in any 
possible world where it is applicable.
40. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 99.
41. Cfr. michael alMeida, «Evil’s Vague Necessity», a paper presented at the Sec-
ond annual Philosophy of religion Conference at Baylor University, Waco, Texas, in 
2007, retrieved 15 may 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://baylor.edu/content/ser-
vices/document.php/41630.pdf., p. 1.
42. William l. rowe, «The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of atheism», in 
The Problem of Evil, ed. marilyn mcCord adams and robert merrihew adams (oxford: 
oxford University Press, 1990), p. 129.
43. Cfr. richard swinbUrne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1998), p. 19.
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The success of the local argument from evil, atheist thinks, greatly 
depends on supposing that the basic moral principle above is indeed neces-
sarily correct as a moral principle, and that it is the correct moral principle 
to appeal to when evaluating God’s moral accountability with regards to the 
evils of the world. The atheist supposes that this principle is applicable to 
the state of affairs where God is the moral agent who allows and prevents 
certain evils. With these suppositions, atheist then charges God of not act-
ing in accordance with the principle.
Here, lowell Friesen reminds us that a moral principle tells an agent 
in what manner he ought to act or not to act, and that therefore any defense 
of theism against the local argument would have to do one of two things: ei-
ther it must grant atheist that such a principle is correct as a moral principle 
and that God acts in accordance with it after all (contrary to the atheist’s 
charge), or that it must show that the principle is wrong in the first place as 
a moral principle44. Van inwagen chooses to do the latter.
Contrary to atheist’s claim, van inwagen’s Theist argues that SP is 
not a correct basic moral principle. Supplied with the supplementary prem-
ises, here is our reconstruction of van inwagen’s
Theist’s Main Argument:
(1)  a basic moral principle concerning an agent’s prevention of 
evils is one that is necessarily correct in any state of affairs (in 
any possible world) in which there is an agent preventing some 
evils and allowing some evils.
(2)  The moral principle appealed to by atheist is necessarily cor-
rect if and only if there is no state of affairs (involving an agent 
preventing some evils and allowing some evils) in which it can 
be wrong – i.e., wrong, because it obliges a moral agent to do 
something the agent is not morally obliged to do.
(3)  But there is a state of affairs (involving an agent preventing 
some evils and allowing some evils) in which the principle can 
be wrong, namely, that state of affairs:
 (3a)  where a moral agent is justified in the permission of a cer-
tain amount of evil for the accomplishment of some good 
purpose, but where the amount of evils necessary for the 
accomplishment of this purpose is vague;
 (3b)  where the vagueness of this matter is due to the fact that 
there are no precise boundaries between the terms in 
question;
44. lowell Friesen, «Vagueness, moral obligation, and van inwagen’s Defense of 
Theism from the local argument from Evil», retrieved 15 may 2008 from the World 
Wide Web: http://people.umass.edu/lfriesen/research/van%20inwagen%20on%20the% 
20argument%20from%20evil.pdf., p. 8. 
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 (3c)  where, therefore, there is no number n such that (i) if 
the agent had prevented n (or fewer) of the evils that the 
agent in fact allowed, the good purpose would have been 
achieved just the same, and (ii) if the agent had prevented 
n + 1 (or more) of those evils from taking place, the good 
purpose would not have been achieved45;
 (3d)  where the prevention of any number, m, of evils would not 
have a significantly different effect from the prevention 
of m + 1 evils or m – 1 evils as regards either the achieve-
ment or the non-achievement of the good purpose;
 (3e)  where, therefore, no significant overall good and no sig-
nificant overall evil is achieved by the prevention of any 
number, m, of evils which the prevention of m + 1 evils or 
m – 1 evils could not have achieved as well; and
 (3f)  where, therefore, there is no minimum amount of evils 
necessary for the accomplishment of the good purpose; 
and
 (3g)  where, therefore (given the no-minimum thesis), the moral 
agent is not morally obliged to prevent any given instance 
of evil (and thus not morally reproachable for allowing 
some instance of evil) that is not necessary for the ac-
complishment of some greater good or the prevention of 
an evil equally bad or worse.
(4)  But the application of the moral principle appealed to by athe-
ist to the state of affairs described in Theist’s Proposition (3) 
above in effect obliges the moral agent to prevent the occur-
rence of any instance of evil that is «not necessary for the 
achievement of some greater good or for the prevention of an 
evil equally bad or worse».
(5)  Therefore, the moral principle appealed to by atheist is not a 
necessarily correct moral principle in any state of affairs in 
which there is an agent preventing some evils and allowing 
some evils.
(6)  Therefore, the moral principle appealed to by atheist is not 
a basic moral principle concerning an agent’s prevention of 
evils.
Theist’s Proof for His Proposition (3) (the wrongness of the principle 
as shown when it is applied to a state of affairs where a moral agent has to 
act in situations where there are no precise boundaries regarding the terms 
in question):
45. Cfr. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 106.
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(7)  a moral agent who justifiably permits a certain amount of evil 
and prevents a certain amount of evil necessarily draws a line 
somewhere between evils he allows and evils he prevents.
(8)  in the state of affairs described in Theist’s Proposition (3), where 
an agent is justified in the permission of a certain amount of 
evil but where vagueness persists as regards the amount neces-
sary for the achievement of some good purpose), any line that 
the agent decides to draw between prevented evils and permit-
ted evils would in effect be an arbitrary line.
(9)  a line drawn between prevented evils and non-prevented ones 
is arbitrary when there is no special reason for the moral agent’s 
placing it exactly where it is and not somewhere else where it 
could have included the prevention of one more instance of evil, 
despite the fact that this latter alternative is equally conceivable 
as the actual placement.
Example (based on van inwagen’s): a jail warden is in a position to 
(i.e. «able to» and «morally permitted to») subtract or not to subtract a day 
in prison from the ten-year prison sentence of a convicted felon. in this ex-
ample, the judge has given the warden the power and authority to determine 
how many prison days to subtract from a prisoner’s sentence, provided only 
that he be guided by the principle that the prisoner should be left at least 
«with the minimum number of prison days necessary to achieve the good 
purpose of deterring him from committing another felony». it is a vague 
matter, at least to this warden, how many prison days (granted that a day in 
prison is an evil) he would be obliged to subtract from prisoner Blodgett’s 
ten-year sentence in order to leave the prisoner with just the minimum pris-
on time consistent with deterring him from re-offending.
Consequently, it is also a vague matter to the warden whether ten 
years (i.e., 3,652 days) minus two days or ten years minus three days is the 
magic number for effectively deterring Blodgett. The warden however feels 
that ten years minus two days would not have a significant deterring effect 
compared to ten years minus three days, in the same way that ten years 
minus three days would not have a significant deterring effect compared to 
ten years minus four days. in short, the warden feels that whatever deterring 
effect a given number of days in prison (n) is supposed to have, the same 
number of days minus one (n – 1) will practically have the same deterring 
effect.
When the warden, however, thinks about the reduction of the sen-
tence to one day in prison compared to no day in prison at all, he still feels 
that there’s no significant difference as regards the deterring effect of these 
two options; but the reason this time is because one day in prison doesn’t 
deter the crime of felony at all. But where does the magic number for ef-
fective deterrence lie? Unfortunately, it is vague to the warden. But he has 
to make a decision as to how many prison days to subtract from the pris-
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oner’s sentence. Given the vagueness of the matter, he cannot but draw an 
arbitrary line, say, ten years minus 96 days. That would be preventing the 
evil of «prison day number 3,557», and leaving the prisoner with just 3,556 
days in prison.
There is no special reason for setting the reduction at 96 days. The 
warden is definitely in a position to reduce 97 instead of just 96 days. But 
he doesn’t do that. otherwise, unless the vagueness disappears, the same 
principle that obliges him to pick 97 rather than 96 would then oblige him 
to pick 98 rather than 97, and then 499 rather than 498, and then 3,000 
rather than 2,999, and so on, until it gets to the choice between 2 days left in 
prison and 1 day left in prison, and then 1 day and 0. But of course, 0 or 1, 2 
or 3, or perhaps even 4 or 5 days in prison, and so on, would not effectively 
deter felony, or so it appears to the warden at least. But then again it’s vague 
for the warden at what exact number of days in prison felony begins to be 
deterred for prisoner Blodgett.
(10)  a moral principle that in effect prohibits a moral agent from 
drawing an arbitrary line in a state of affairs where it is impos-
sible not to draw an arbitrary line is wrong.
(11)  But atheist’s supposed moral principle, when applied to the 
state of affairs described in Theist’s Proposition (3), in effect 
prohibits the moral agent from drawing an arbitrary line where 
the moral agent cannot but draw an arbitrary line.
(12)  [explanation of the preceding] The way by which atheist’s sup-
posed moral principle prohibits the drawing of an arbitrary line 
(where there being no arbitrary line is impossible) is the follow-
ing: atheist’s principle obliges the moral agent to prevent every 
evil (any evil brought into the discussion) he is in a position to 
prevent – even under the given conditions of vagueness – to the 
effect that either:
 (12a)  No line at all is drawn between justifiably prevented evils 
and non-prevented in the sense that all evils are prevent-
ed; but this in effect negates the state of affairs described 
in Theist’s Proposition (3) where the agent is justified in 
allowing a certain number of evils; or
 (12b)  The line drawn is non-arbitrary at least in the sense that it 
must include the prevention of this particular instance of 
evil (e.g., preventing what would have been a convicted 
felon’s 3,556th day in prison rather than just the 3,557th) 
– and, for that matter, any single isolated instance of evil 
that may, one by one, be brought into the discussion (al-
though, presumably, the ones that are not yet presently 
brought into the argument in a single act of argumenta-
tion may be justifiably allowed); but then, repeated ar-
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gumentations, each time based on a different instance of 
evil until every single evil will be covered, will have the 
accumulated effect that the agent will be left with no evil 
that he is not obliged to prevent. But this in effect again 
negates the state of affairs described in Theist’s Proposi-
tion (3) where the agent is justified in allowing (i.e., not 
obliged to prevent) a certain number of evils.
(13)  Therefore, since it prohibits the drawing of an arbitrary line 
where it is impossible not to draw an arbitrary line, atheist’s 
supposed moral principle is wrong when applied to the state of 
affairs described in Theist’s Proposition (3).
But then, what van inwagen’s Theist has so far shown in the above 
demonstration is simply that the moral principle («the standard position on 
evil») appealed to by atheist is not applicable in a certain situation, i.e., 
it is not the correct moral principle to guide an agent’s actions in prevent-
ing or allowing some evils where certain boundaries are vague, at least to 
the agent. in itself, the demonstration above is not yet a defense of theism 
against the local argument from evil, since, for all anyone knows, the above 
demonstration may be correct but it is irrelevant to a state of affairs where 
God is the moral agent preventing and allowing certain amounts of evil.
For there to be a defense of theism based on the preliminary dem-
onstration above, van inwagen’s Theist has to state that God’s situation in 
preventing a certain amount of evil and not preventing a certain amount is 
in fact (or at least, that it is possible to suppose that it is in fact) an instance 
of the state of affairs described in Theist’s Proposition (3), i.e., that the mat-
ter on the minimum amount of evil necessary for the atonement must be 
vague to God.
Van inwagen’s Theist says that this is the case – at least according to 
a certain account of vagueness – as the next sections will show. (of course, 
according to another theory of vagueness and combined with the concept of 
omniscience, van inwagen’s defense becomes problematic since the omni-
scient moral agent God would then never find Himself in the state of affairs 
described in Theist’s Proposition [3], as will be explained below).
3.2.2. The No-Minimum Argument
in his defense of theism against the local argument, van inwagen’s 
Theist proposes:
ProPoSiTioN (14) [claiming that the state of affairs where God is 
the moral agent preventing and permitting some evils falls under the gen-
eral state of affairs described in Theist’s Proposition (3)]:
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it is possible that the state of affairs of the actual world is one:
(14a)  where God is justified in the permission of a certain number of 
evils in accordance with His atonement plan for separated hu-
mans, but where the amount and membership of the instances 
of non-prevented evils necessary for the success of His atone-
ment Plan is vague;
(14b)  where the vagueness of this matter is due to the fact that there 
are no precise boundaries between the terms «evils necessary 
for the success of the atonement» and «evils unnecessary for 
the success of the atonement»;
(14c)  where, therefore, there is no number n such that (i) if God had 
prevented n (or fewer) of the evils which He in fact allowed, the 
atonement would have been successful just the same, and (ii) 
if God had prevented n + 1 (or more) of those evils from taking 
place, the atonement would not have been a success46;
(14d) where the prevention of any number, m, of evils would not have 
a significantly different effect from the prevention of m + 1 
evils or from m – 1 evils, as regards either the success or the 
failure of the atonement;
(14e)  where, therefore, no significant overall good and no significant 
overall evil is achieved by the prevention of any number, m, of 
evils which the prevention of m + 1 evils or m – 1 evils could 
not have achieved as well;
(14f)  where, therefore, there is no minimum amount of evils neces-
sary for the success of the Atonement; and
(14g)  where, therefore (given the no-minimum thesis), God is not 
morally obliged to prevent any given instance of evil, and thus 
not morally reproachable for allowing some instance of evil, 
that is not necessary for the success of the atonement or for the 
prevention of the failure of the atonement.
if van inwagen’s reasoning from the general state of affairs con-
cerning all moral agents (Theist’s Proposition (3)) to the particular state 
of affairs concerning the moral agent God (Proposition (14)) is to be valid, 
then we must presume van inwagen’s Theist to be saying something to this 
effect: Even God now finds Himself in a situation where He cannot but 
draw a morally arbitrary line between prevented and non-prevented evils. 
Having created human beings (who turned out, as a contingent matter of 
fact, to abuse their freedom) and having set in motion the accomplishment 
of a plan of atonement, the morally perfect God is now in a situation where 
He prevents certain evils, but where He cannot prevent all evils, without 
46. Cfr. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 106.
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thereby bringing about the worse evil of having His atonement plan fail. 
But then the amount of evils necessary for the success of His atonement 
Plan is vague. There are no precise boundaries between the terms «evils 
necessary for the success of the atonement» and «evils unnecessary for 
the success of the atonement». Nevertheless, God has to draw a line some-
where. and so, wherever He draws it, it will be an arbitrary line. There is 
no non-arbitrary line that God can draw – just as none of the moral agents 
in the general state of affairs described in Theist’s Proposition (3) is able to 
draw a non-arbitrary line47.
one particular gratuitous horror, such as the murder of mari luz, 
simply happened to be among the evils on the «non-prevented evils» side 
of the arbitrary line. There is no special reason for the exact placement of 
the line where it actually is. God was very much in the position to prevent 
the murder of mari luz. But He did not. But then He is not bound by the 
moral principle appealed to by atheist, because, given the vagueness of the 
amount of evil necessary for the success of His atonement Plan, God is in 
a state of affairs where it cannot logically be demanded of Him that He act 
according to atheist’s supposed moral principle. This makes the principle 
wrong as a moral principle48.
We take note at this juncture that (14b) is the account of vagueness 
according to which van inwagen says his (14a) must be understood. But, of 
course (14b) is not the only account of vagueness.
47. To say, however, that «there is no non-arbitrary line that God can draw» has at 
least two senses. The first sense says only that there is no line that God can draw that 
does not look arbitrary to those who evaluate God’s moral accountability and by which 
they can judge whether God acted wrongly or justifiably in not preventing a particular 
evil. The second sense includes the first and says in addition that there is also no line that 
can be drawn that does not look arbitrary to God Himself and by which He can make a 
specific decision in regard to preventing or allowing a particular evil. according to an 
alternative approach, one that resembles the approach of most skeptical defenses, only 
the first sense can be and should be insisted – while the second sense may be left open 
(and it is better left unsettled) – by a van inwagen-type of defense that uses an account of 
vagueness. (more of this will be said in the next sections.)
48. as far as van inwagen is concerned, if the moral principle appealed to by athe-
ist is to be wrong as a moral principle, i.e., wrong as a guide to a moral agent’s action 
(and not just as the wrong principle to invoke in certain states of affairs), then it must be 
wrong as a guide to action for all moral agents, whether human or divine, in any state 
of affairs where they prevent a certain number of evils and allow a certain number of 
evils, but where the boundaries between «evils necessary for the accomplishment of a 
good purpose» and «evils not necessary for the accomplishment of the good purpose» 
are vague. moreover, as already expressed earlier, atheist’s principle is wrong because it 
prohibits the drawing of morally arbitrary lines where circumstances are vague and where 
therefore it is impossible not to draw morally arbitrary lines if the agent must act. Now, 
whether or not it is reasonable to suppose that God ever finds Himself in a situation where 
He is vague about something would depend on which particular account of vagueness 
one supposes, as will be shown shortly.
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and so, how does van inwagen intend «vagueness» to be understood 
in his Theist’s Proposition (14), as well as in Theist’s Proposition (3) earlier? 
according to lowell Friesen’s analysis, van inwagen’s defense of theism 
from the local argument pushes the acceptance of a particular (non-epistem-
ic) account of vagueness, one that many philosophers do not accept49.
3.2.3.  Rejection of the Epistemic View of Vagueness
Van inwagen’s Theist employs a reductio ad absurdum to reject 
epistemicism. according to epistemicism, natural language terms, such as 
«tall» and «short», have precise extensions in themselves. There is a certain 
height (in precise millimeters, say n mms.) such that people who reach it 
would be «tall», while those who are a millimeter shorter would be «short». 
There is thus a precise boundary between tallness (e.g., n mms.) and short-
ness (n mms. minus 1 mm.). James Cargile also refers to this account of 
vagueness as the realistic account. There is some specific instant at which a 
creature, for example, ceases to be a tadpole and becomes a frog, and some 
specific instant at which a child acquires the ability to speak English while 
an instant before he did not50.
But such finite creatures as human beings are irremediably ignorant 
of such precise boundaries because of their epistemological limits, e.g., their 
failure to know in full detail the relationship between the world and relevant 
linguistic conventions and practices of the relevant linguistic communities 
on a particular occasion of utterance51. We are, so to speak, vague about the 
precise extensions of our natural language terms. as a result, people are not 
uniform in their use of the predicates «tall» and «short». But, according to 
epistemicism, this is not because these terms do not have precise extensions; 
rather, people simply have inexact knowledge of the exact fact of the matter 
out there.
The suggestion, of course, is that if natural language terms have pre-
cise extensions in themselves, then it is not true that no non-arbitrary line 
can be drawn between two contraries of the vague variety. it is technically 
49. Friesen, «Vagueness, moral obligation, and van inwagen’s Defense of Theism 
from the local argument from Evil», pp. 1 and 13.
50. James carGile, «The Sorites Paradox», in Vagueness: A Reader, ed. rosanna 
Keefe and Peter Smith (Cambridge, massachusetts: The miT Press, 1996), pp. 96 and 
98.
51. Timothy williaMson, Vagueness (london and New York: routledge, 1994), 
especially pp. 203-212, 217, 231, 234-237. For his detailed explanation of the source of 
human beings’ ignorance of the cut-offs of vague predicates, see also Timothy William-
son, «Vagueness and ignorance», in Vagueness: A Reader, ed. rosanna Keefe and Peter 
Smith (Cambridge, massachusetts: The miT Press, 1996), pp. 265-280. 
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possible, according to the epistemic account, for there to be a non-arbitrary 
line between «tall» and «short» people, once the epistemic status of the one 
who applies these predicates improves in regard to knowing the boundar-
ies. in fact, it is simply a question of finding out the exact boundaries since, 
according to epistemicism, vagueness is nothing but a species of igno-
rance with respect to extensions52. Consequently, epistemicism insists that 
the vagueness regarding the boundary between evils necessary and evils 
unnecessary for the success of God’s atonement plan is a question of not 
knowing the exact boundaries, but that such precise extensions exist.
Now, van inwagen’s defense of theism against the local argument has 
these two features: it grants (for the sake of argument) atheist’s proposition 
that there are gratuitous evils, and it uses vagueness as a central feature. 
This type of defense, however, cannot succeed if vagueness is understood 
in the epistemic sense. There are two reasons.
First, if van inwagen adopts an epistemic account of vagueness, then 
he would have to deal with the following objection: if natural language 
terms have precise extensions and if vagueness were only a matter of find-
ing out the exact boundaries between two contraries, then an omniscient 
being such as the theist’s God would surely know such boundaries. There 
doesn’t seem to be anything logically contradictory in supposing that if pre-
cise extensions exist between natural language terms, they can be known 
by an omniscient being. if so, then the matter regarding the exact minimum 
amount of evils necessary for the success of the atonement Plan would not 
be vague to an omniscient God, even if it is to humans.
But if it is not vague to God, then Theist’s Proposition (14) cannot 
be used as an instance of Theist’s Proposition (3). God’s epistemic status 
in regard to the minimum amount of evils necessary for the success of the 
atonement would not be the same as humans’ epistemic status in regard 
to it. Consequently, even if the state of affairs described in Proposition (3) 
correctly represents the state of affairs that human moral agents sometimes 
find themselves in, it doesn’t follow that the omniscient God would ever find 
Himself in a state of affairs where He is vague about something. and even 
if human beings are sometimes excused from acting according to the moral 
52. Van inwagen’s already expressed in «Why Vagueness is a mystery» his rejec-
tion of vagueness theories that defend the existence of precise boundaries. a Northern 
European adult male with a height of 200 centimeters, for example, would be «just tall: 
tall without qualification». But, for van inwagen, there is simply no precise height (in 
precise number of centimeters) that marks the greatest lower bound of the category «just 
tall», even if a man with a height of 150 cm. would obviously be «just not tall». But van 
inwagen hastens to add that if heights compose a continuum, then it seems that there is a 
least height such that a man of that height is tall, for how can there not be such a height? 
He admits, «i have no idea how to resolve this paradox». See Peter van inwaGen, «Why 
Vagueness is a mystery», Acta Analytica 17, no. 29 (2002): pp. 15-16.
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principle appealed to by atheist on the ground that they are vague about cer-
tain boundaries, it doesn’t follow that God will not be bound by the moral 
principle. in fact, it would seem to follow that God is bound to act according 
to the principle (supposing that it is correct, if not proven to be wrong on other 
grounds) since, given the epistemic account, He would not be vague about the 
boundary between evils necessary and evils unnecessary for the success of 
the atonement Plan. Hence, it would seem that Theist’s attempt at showing 
the supposed error of the moral principle appealed to by atheist would not 
really be relevant to a defense of Theism against the local argument.
and here is a second reason why van inwagen’s defense cannot use 
an epistemic account of vagueness. if he affirms that omniscience includes 
knowledge of the precise boundaries of natural language terms, then he 
would be forced to take perhaps the only theistic way out: give up granting 
to atheist that gratuitous evils exist. But in doing so, van inwagen would 
then simply be taking the skeptical approach, casting reasonable doubt on 
the premise that there are gratuitous evils at all. This, however, would in 
effect be contrary to van inwagen’s preferred approach to the problem of 
gratuitous evils, where he grants the atheist that «there has been, in the 
history of the world, at least one gratuitous horror such that if it had not 
occurred, the world would be no worse than it is».
3.2.4.  Chance and Arbitrariness in the Prevention
           and Non-Prevention of Evils
No matter how many evils God decides to prevent, He has to draw a 
line somewhere. To one side of the line lie the cases of prevented evils that 
God in His mercy and love decided to prevent. To the other side of the line 
lie the cases of non-prevented evils that God, also in His mercy and love, de-
cided to allow so that the great creaturely good of the atonement will come 
to fruition. Van inwagen’s non-epistemic account of vagueness suggests that 
this line is a morally arbitrary line wherever God draws it, and that its actual 
placement in the actual world is a matter that God left to chance.
When human beings misused their free will and separated them-
selves from God, the existence of horrors was one of the natural and inevi-
table consequences of this separation. Each individual horror, however, may 
well have been due to chance... [W]hen and where it happens, may well be a 
matter of chance. in separating ourselves from God, we have become... the 
playthings of chance53.
53. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 103; see also «The magnitude, Duration, 
and Distribution of Evil: a Theodicy», pp. 115-116.
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But van inwagen clarifies just what he means by «chance»:
What i shall mean by saying that an event is a «chance» occurrence, 
or a state of affairs a «matter of chance» or «due to chance», is this: The 
event or state of affairs is without purpose or significance; it is not a part 
of anyone’s plan; it serves no one’s end; it might very well not have been. a 
chance event, in other words, is one such that, if someone asks of it, «Why 
did that happen?» the only right answer is: «There is no reason or explana-
tion; it just happened»54.
Van inwagen’s saying that «an event has no explanation» does not 
mean that the event has no proximate explanation whatsoever. E.g. The 
death of a man who gets run over by a car while routinely crossing the street 
would have some proximate explanations: the car brakes failed, the driver 
was drunk, the man was distracted, etc. But this may still be a «chance 
event» in van inwagen’s sense. The death of the 5,578, 231st victim of the 
Holocaust would of course have proximate explanations (some of which 
might still be accessible to investigators through some diligent research), 
and still such death would be a «chance event» in van inwagen’s sense. 
To say of an event that «there is no reason or explanation for it; it just hap-
pened» means in van inwagen’s context that God had no specific reason for 
allowing this event (a particular evil), although He may indeed have some 
general reason for allowing events of this kind (pointless evils).
Van inwagen does not intend his concept of «chance» to be incom-
patible with Divine Providence. in fact, he defends the rightful place of 
chance in a world sustained by God with such propositions as the follow-
ing:
(1)  The world (or «universe», «cosmos», «nature», etc.) consists of 
a certain number of «elementary particles», i.e., small, indivis-
ible units of matter.
(2)  God’s creation and conservation of the world (and of all things 
in it) means that God constantly supplies each of these elemen-
tary particles with causal powers, so that each one possesses 
some intrinsic capacity to affect the motions of other particles.
(3)  Each particle almost always possesses the same causal pow-
ers.
(4)  on certain occasions, however, God performs a miracle in the 
following sense: He momentarily supplies a few particles with 
causal powers different from their normal powers, thereby caus-
54. Peter van inwaGen, «The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God», in 
Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, ed. Thomas V. morris 
(ithaca and london: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 220-221.
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ing some part of the natural world to diverge from the course it 
would have taken without this momentary supply of abnormal 
powers55.
(5)  God’s eternal plan56 as regards creation consists of the totality 
of all His decrees except «reactive decrees» (i.e., those decrees 
issued by God in response to a contingent event that God has 
not decreed).
(6)  Some of the events that take place in the world are «reactive», 
i.e., they are issued by God in response to a contingent event 
that God has not decreed (e.g., the carrying out of God’s plan of 
atonement for separated humans, after they actually fell; God’s 
healing of a sick man in response to a prayer).
(7)  Some of the events that take place in the world are therefore not 
part of God’s eternal plan, e.g.:
 (7a)  that the particular species homo sapiens (human nature 
as it is actually known today) should exist is not a part of 
God’s eternal plan; but the existence of rational animals 
made in God’s image and possessing free will and capable 
of love is part of God’s plan57.
55. Because of the views expressed in the above propositions, alfred J. Freddoso 
(«Comment on van inwagen’s “The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God”», 
retrieved 15 may 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/
chance.htm) accuses van inwagen of weak deism, to which charge van inwagen coun-
ters that a God who continuously sustains all things in existence and continuously con-
serves their causal powers is «immanent enough» for him, and thus his position cannot 
be charged of denying that God directly causes alterations in the created world, which is 
what deism is. See van inwagen, «The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God», 
p. 215, n. 4.
56. Van inwagen adds the qualification «eternal» so as to technically distinguish 
between God’s «eternal plan» (or God’s «unqualified plan», or God’s plan ante omnia 
saecula) and God’s plan in response to a contingent event that is not part of His eternal 
plan. See van inwagen, «The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God», p. 223, n. 
8. Freddoso, however, finds it too restrictive to categorize the objects of God’s decrees 
to just states of affairs that God brings about by Himself. Freddoso presents an alterna-
tive account of divine decrees in which «the objects of God’s decrees are non-evil states 
of affairs that God brings about directly either by Himself or in cooperation with (free 
and non-free) created or secondary causes». moreover, Freddoso identifies a third sort 
of divine decree – «permissive decrees», he calls them – whose objects are evil states 
of affairs that God knowingly permits to obtain. and so, under Freddoso’s account, ev-
ery event in the created universe is either antecedently or consequently or permissively 
willed by God.
57. Van inwagen’s view is that, for all we know, what God planned was only that 
some rational beings would be capable of loving Him and thus share an eternity of happi-
ness in union with Him, but as to what the precise nature of these rational beings would 
be (and, we may add, whether they would be beings of only one particular species or of 
more than one species) is something that God may well have left to chance. [See van 
inwagen, «The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God», pp. 225-226, 229.] of 
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 (7b)  that human beings should actually abuse their freedom 
and suffer as a natural consequence is not part of God’s 
eternal plan; but God’s allowing a certain amount of evil 
and suffering in general is now part of God’s «contingent 
rescue plan» in response to man’s actual rebellion58.
(8)  a chance event’s not being part of God’s plan may be due to 
one or more of the following sources of chance: a) human free 
will; b) natural indeterminism59; and c) the «initial arrange-
ment» of the world’s elementary particles.
(9)  among the events that are simply due to chance and not part 
of God’s plan are some particular instances of evils (e.g., the 
murder of mari luz) even if God may have a morally sufficient 
reason for allowing a certain amount of evil of this kind in 
accordance with His «contingent plan» of atonement for sepa-
rated humans.
(9)  it may be that some (other) particular instances of evils are such 
that God has a special reason for allowing them.
(10)  it may be that sometimes God miraculously [in the sense of 
«miracle» specified in Proposition (4) above] intervenes in the 
course of nature to prevent some particular evils – but He does 
not do this all the time.
in van inwagen’s schema, it is in response to the contingent fact that 
humans actually abused their freedom that God reactively decreed to leave 
in place some of the natural consequences of this abuse. God had a vast ar-
ray of alternative amounts of evils to allow (other than the actual amount). 
But since, as van inwagen argues, there is no such thing as the minimum 
amount necessary for the success of the atonement, God, to some extent, 
left to chance the exact number of actual evils. if it is noted that among the 
sources of «chance events» in van inwagen’s account is human free will, 
course, if one theist would like to add the thesis that it was definitely only man (with 
precisely his human nature as it is known today) that God planned to create so as to share 
with Him an eternity of love and happiness, this would not contradict the first proposition 
as stated.
58. Freddoso would describe the actual creaturely abuse of freedom as an object 
of God’s permissive will. God wills only in an extended sense – just in the case of per-
missive decrees – the deviations of creatures from God’s non-reactive decrees or God’s 
antecedent plan.
59. Van inwagen defines natural indeterminism as the thesis that «the distribution 
of all the particles of matter in the universe at a given moment, and their causal powers 
at that moment, do not determine the subsequent behavior of the particles». in an inde-
terministic universe, a given state of affairs will have more than one outcome. God does 
not decree the outcomes of «swerves in the void» since – as even modern physics tells 
us – «swerves» are not determined by the causal powers of particles. See van inwagen, 
«The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God», p. 224.
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then it seems plausible indeed to say that the exact actual amount of evil is 
something that God has to some extent left to chance.
For example, it can be that God does everything (except determine 
Joe) to increase the probability that Joe would tell the truth rather than lie 
to a friend today. God supplied the usual causal powers to the particles that 
made up Jo’s brain and vocal cords so that Jo could speak intelligibly and 
exercise his freedom to tell the truth – an opportunity for moral good which 
Jo misused today. Jo freely decided to lie and thus increased the actual 
amount of evil in the world. of course, God could have miraculously inter-
vened to prevent Jo’s lying. But then, it cannot be that God always performs 
«miraculous interventions» to prevent the telling of a lie. if it is insisted that 
God ought to have prevented all cases of lying (while allowing other moral 
evils) since humans would still be significantly free, anyway, in a world 
where lying is impossible, then the same supposed moral obligation that 
required God to prevent lying would have to be required of God in regard 
to the prevention of murder, then adultery, etc., and their consequent suffer-
ings. Now if God always intervened to prevent every moral evil and its con-
sequent sufferings, He would have forfeited the good of there being a world 
where humans exercise their freedom efficaciously. «[Humans] would not 
have efficacious free will if God ensured that only their good choices were 
efficacious»60.
God’s allowing the particular evil of Jo’s lying today (and at least 
some of its consequences) set the actual amount of evil slightly more than 
what it would have been had God prevented the lie. Hence, as van inwagen 
says, «it may be that God has decreed, with respect to this vast array of 
alternative, morally equivalent amounts of suffering, that some member of 
this array shall be the actual amount of suffering, but has left it up to chance 
which member that is»61.
Thus, if one of the sources of the chance event of Jo’s lying today was 
his free will then, it was «by chance» that the actual amount of evil in the 
world was increased by Jo’s telling that one lie. God had no specific reason 
or explanation for allowing Jo’s telling that lie and thereby increasing the 
actual amount of the world’s evils, although God may indeed have mor-
ally sufficient reasons in general for allowing events like the telling of a lie 
(e.g., preserving these states of affairs: there being creatures significantly 
exercising their freedom, and there being a necessary, though insufficient, 
condition for the success of the atonement). But, obviously, the actualiza-
tion of both states of affairs couldn’t have been made impossible by God’s 
60. swinbUrne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, p. 11.
61. Peter van inwaGen, «The Problem of Evil, the Problem of air, and the Problem 
of Silence», Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion, ed. James E. Tomber-
lin (ridgeview: atascadero, 1991): p. 144.
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prevention of one or two instances of lying. in this sense, the increase in 
the exact total amount of evils in the actual world by Jo’s lying today (God 
not preventing it and its evil consequences) is a chance event, even if Jo was 
personally morally responsible for his lie.
The exact actual placement of the arbitrary line between prevented 
evils and non-prevented ones is a matter that God left to chance in much the 
same way that, since no significant overall good is achieved by the number 
of strands of hair on Ed’s head exactly totaling up to 105,768 on april 14, 
2008, then its being exactly 105,768 on this day and not 105,769 or 105,767 
is a matter that God «left to chance». Similarly, the exact actual placement 
of the line between the evils that God prevents and the evils that God allows 
is a contingent matter of fact that has no special a priori moral reason or ex-
planation for being exactly where it is, i.e., where it includes the murder of 
mari luz, but excludes the murder of my aunt lucy, in the «non-prevented 
evils» side. and, of course, when humans do not see any special explanation 
why something is, and is as it is when it could have been otherwise than it is, 
they simply say it was by «chance» that the event took place the way it did.
Some, however, find too strong the claim that the amount of evils 
necessary for the success of the atonement is vague even to God. They 
prefer the weaker claim: So long as the amount of evils necessary for God’s 
purposes are vague to humans (whether or not it is also vague to God), 
wherever God puts the cut-off point between permitted evils and prevent-
ed evils, its actual placement would always look arbitrary to humans, and 
would appear to them to be a «matter of chance», in the sense of having no 
explanation discernible to humans at least, whether or not God has a special 
reason for its occurring exactly the way it did.
3.3.  Consequences of Some alternative accounts of Vagueness
i will do two things in this section. First, i will try to explore the con-
sequences of substituting van inwagen’s account of vagueness with some 
alternative accounts to see if any of them would make a better conceptual 
framework for a vagueness-based defense against the local argument from 
evil. Secondly, i will propose what, in my judgment, a theistic defense using 
vagueness as a feature can at most appeal to if it is to be acceptable to an 
audience of ideal agnostics regardless of their predilection for one or other 
account of vagueness.
in transition, we ask: if for van inwagen «the amount of evils nec-
essary for the success of God’s atonement Plan» is «vague» in a non-
epistemic sense (with its no-minimum thesis), in what specific sense are 
they «vague»? according to what account of vagueness are these states of 
affairs said to be «without precise boundaries»? There are a number of al-
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ternative accounts of vagueness62, but van inwagen’s Theist doesn’t specify 
according to which particular non-epistemic account «vague amounts of 
evil» should be understood.
We now explore the consequences of some alternative accounts of 
vagueness on a van inwagen-type of theistic defense that keeps the follow-
ing two features: non-epistemic vagueness as a key feature, and insistence 
on granting atheist that gratuitous evils exist.
3.3.1.  Supervaluationism and Evil’s Vague Necessity
one popular alternative to epistemicism in the literature on vague-
ness, as we have just seen, is supervaluationism. lowell Friesen prefers to 
call it the «indecision view» of vagueness. according to this view, vague 
natural language terms have imprecise extensions as a result of semantic 
indecision, i.e., intelligent agents simply have not bothered to specify pre-
cisely what the necessary and sufficient conditions are for such vague terms 
as baldness, redness, tallness, thinness, fatness, etc. People could, perhaps, 
do so, if they so desired, but they haven’t63. The important thing to note in 
this account of vagueness is what it says about the source of the vagueness, 
namely, a person’s undecidedness, for whatever reason, to set the precise 
extensions of his concepts.
if van inwagen’s use of «vagueness» in his defense of theism against 
the local argument is to be understood according to the indecision view, it 
would have the following two consequences. First, it offers one plausible 
explanation why the matter regarding the minimum amount of evils neces-
sary for the success God’s atonement plan is vague to us human beings. 
This matter is vague to us because we are undecided about the extensions 
of many of our concepts and terms. For example, we have not decided pre-
cisely on what a «restored world» would look like, or on what the necessary 
and sufficient conditions would be for there to be a «restored humanity», 
etc. Consequently, given our indecision on a lot of concepts related to our 
understanding of a «divine plan of atonement», we would not be the type of 
epistemic agents to be clear about the amount of evil required for the suc-
cess of this divine plan of atonement.
62. For a survey of different accounts of vagueness, see rosanna KeeFe and Peter 
sMith, eds., Vagueness: A Reader (Cambridge, massachusetts: The miT Press, 1996). 
See also rosanna KeeFe, Theories of Vagueness (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000); and Delia GraFF and Timothy williaMson, eds., Vagueness (aldershot: 
ashgate, 2000).
63. Friesen, «Vagueness, moral obligation, and van inwagen’s Defense of Theism 
from the local argument from Evil», p. 14.
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But then the vagueness of this matter to us human beings is irrelevant 
to whether or not God is bound to act according to atheist’s supposed moral 
principle. (of course, the vagueness of this matter to us would be relevant 
to whether or not we are in a position to accuse God of moral imperfection 
on the ground that He did not prevent this particular evil, e.g., the murder of 
mari luz. But this would be another defensive approach, the one that i think 
most skeptical approaches would suggest van inwagen’s Theist should have 
pursued.) So long as van inwagen sticks to his defensive strategy of showing 
the wrongness of the moral principle appealed to by atheist when applied to 
situations where the boundaries between certain terms are vague, he must 
show that it is a vague matter to God how many evils are necessary for the 
success of His atonement plan.
Unfortunately – and this is now the second consequence of using the 
indecision view of vagueness – the defense would be committed to affirm-
ing that the vagueness is due to God’s semantic indecision. let us quote 
Friesen on what divine semantic indecision would be like.
[God’s semantic indecision] is tantamount to saying that the con-
cepts involved in God’s thought or the predicates involved in God’s lan-
guage, to whatever extent it makes sense to speak of God’s concepts or 
God’s language, don’t have precise extensions. But is this consequence con-
sistent with God’s nature as it is traditionally understood? in order for God 
to be «guilty» of semantic indecision, God would have to be undecided 
about what the extensions of his concepts were. But why would God be 
undecided about the extensions of his concepts? is it the case the [sic] God 
can’t be bothered to make his thought precise? or is God not capable of 
making his thought precise in the required way? an affirmative answer to 
either question seems inconsistent with God’s nature64.
a God, therefore, who is semantically undecided, or worse, a God 
who is semantically indecisive, doesn’t appear to be consistent with the tra-
ditional concept of God – unless a van-inwagen-type proposal would again 
be made to modify the traditional definitions of omnipotence and omni-
science, arguing this time that semantic decision regarding the issue under 
discussion is an intrinsically impossible state of affairs and hence semantic 
indecision in this case would not really be inconsistent with both attributes. 
However, there doesn’t seem to be any coherent way of doing this.
64. Friesen, «Vagueness, moral obligation, and van inwagen’s Defense of Theism 
from the local argument from Evil», pp. 14-15.
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3.3.2.  Indeterminism and Evil’s Vague Necessity
Different variations of the indeterminist approach to vagueness – 
for example, the ones defended by Kit Fine and Steven rieber – do not 
fare any better when used as the conceptual framework for van inwagen’s 
vagueness-based defense. Kit Fine’s indeterminist account of vagueness in-
cludes the claim that «ordinary ambiguous sentences are neither true nor 
false when one disambiguation is true and the other is false»65. Thus, the 
sentence «John went to the bank» is neither true nor false if John went to 
the river bank but not the money bank66. Vagueness in this case is due to the 
fact that one has not precisified which sentence is referred to (i.e., whether 
it is «John went to the river bank» or «John went to the money bank») when 
«John went to the bank» is uttered67.
once we apply, however, this account of vagueness to the parallel 
sentence relevant to a defense of theism («The amount of evil m is neces-
sary for the atonement»), it would be clear right away that we have the 
following consequences: There seems to be no morally sufficient reason 
why an omniscient and morally perfect God should be undecided about 
which precisification to employ in order for Him to remove the ambiguity 
of the sentence «The amount of evil m is necessary for the atonement». 
if vagueness were only a matter of ambiguous sentences, then an omni-
scient God could easily have removed this ambiguity. But then if God’s 
vagueness is removed, van inwagen’s strategy of showing the wrongness 
of the standard position on evil cannot be employed anymore. (of course, 
a very different defense of theism can be made by appealing only to the 
ambiguity of the same sentence to human beings discussing the argument 
from evil.)
rieber’s indeterminist approach to vagueness uses the concept 
of overlap ambiguity. «The indeterminacy of what is said in uttering an 
overlap-ambiguous statement is a consequence of the indeterminacy of the 
speaker’s intentions». For example, when a speaker says «There is a cow in 
the field», his intentions are indeterminate between two propositions such 
65. Steven rieber, «a Defense of indeterminism», Acta Analytica 17, no. 29 (2002): 
p. 78, citing Kit Fine, «Vagueness, Truth and logic», in Vagueness: A Reader, ed. ro-
sanna Keefe and Peter Smith (Cambridge, massachusetts: The miT Press, 1996), pp. 
137-138.
66. Kit Fine, «Vagueness, Truth and logic», p. 138.
67. Keefe and Smith, however, point out that Fine’s example here is more a case of 
ambiguity rather than vagueness, although, certainly some terms can be ambiguous and 
vague, such as «bank», which has two quite different main senses: financial institutions 
and sloping river edges. See rosanna KeeFe and Peter sMith, «introduction: Theories of 
Vagueness», in Vagueness: A Reader, ed. Keefe and Smith (Cambridge, massachusetts: 
The miT Press, 1996), p. 6.
 EVil aND aBoUNDiNG loVE 325
as «There is a bovine in the field» and «There is a mature female bovine in 
the field»68. Under this account of vagueness, the statement «The amount 
of evil m is necessary for the atonement» would be an overlap-ambiguous 
statement due to the speaker’s indeterminate intentions.
and, of course, if a theistic defender using this approach to vague-
ness is to use van inwagen’s strategy of showing the incorrectness of the 
standard position on evil, he must take it to be the case that it is the moral 
agent God who speaks such a statement at least to Himself (in a way analo-
gous to human utterance), when making the decision about which evils to 
allow and which to prevent. But, again, it seems contradictory to the tra-
ditional concept of God that He should be indeterminate in His intentions 
upon His utterances. (of course, as we noted above, a very different defense 
of theism can be made using only the overlap-ambiguity of the same state-
ment to human beings discussing the argument from evil.)
From what has been shown above, it is clear that a van inwagen-
type defense (one that insists on granting atheist the existence of gratuitous 
evils and that employs vagueness as a key feature) would have disastrous 
consequences for theism when the vagueness is interpreted according to the 
supervaluationist (or indecision view) or the indeterministic approaches to 
vagueness.
We now turn to explore briefly the possibilities of one other account 
of vagueness on a theistic defense against the local argument from evil.
3.3.3.  Ontic Vagueness and Evil’s Vague Necessity
according to this view, there is «ontic vagueness». Vagueness does 
not reside in the relationship between thought (and, by extension, language) 
and the world. Vagueness is rather a fundamental feature of the world itself. 
Variations in the account of what constitutes ontic vagueness have been 
given. «Some have said that ontic-vagueness is a result of the fact that prop-
erties are vague; others have said that vagueness is a feature of the ob-
jects that instantiate properties; still others have said that ontic-vagueness 
is a result of the indeterminacy with respect to property instantiation»69. a 
vague object would be one that has indeterminate, or fuzzy, spatio-temporal 
boundaries – e.g., the indeterminate edges of a cloud, the indeterminacy 
of the exact temporal span of a person’s life, the fuzzy boundaries of mt. 
68. rieber, «a Defense of indeterminism», pp. 78-79.
69. Friesen, «Vagueness, moral obligation, and van inwagen’s Defense of Theism 
from the local argument from Evil», p. 15.
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Everest70, or the temporally vague entity called «the roman Empire»71. 
a cloud, for example, would still be the same cloud if one, two, three, or 
four, etc. molecules are removed from it one at a time. But it is vague at 
which number of removed molecules it ceases to be the same cloud or to 
be a cloud at all.
The common feature in these variants of ontic vagueness that is re-
ally important for our discussion here is the source of the vagueness. in this 
view, vagueness is a fundamental feature of the world (or the object) itself. 
lowell Friesen sees at least two costly consequences when this account 
of vagueness is combined to a van-inwagen-type defense against the local 
argument.
First, since vagueness is located in the very nature of the world itself, 
future empirical investigation may well disconfirm any one of the variants 
of the accounts of ontic vagueness. Consequently, according to Friesen, this 
would make the success of a theistic defense that incorporates this theory of 
vagueness dependent on the findings of future science.
i would like to note, however, in spite of this supposed consequence 
imagined by Friesen, that it is far from obvious whether the vagueness of 
«the amount of evil necessary for the achievement of God’s atonement 
plan» can ever be disconfirmed at all by empirical scientific investigation, 
whether at present or in the future. Before such a possibility can be evalu-
ated coherently, one would have to be clear first about how the vagueness of 
the amount of evil necessary for the atonement may be «located in the very 
nature of the world itself».
a second supposed consequence envisioned by Friesen is more prac-
tical. many of the various ways of understanding ontic vagueness, Friesen 
says, are «philosophical non-starters»72. The general consensus among 
philosophers is that most accounts of ontic vagueness are untenable. They 
doubt, for example, whether it is coherent to say that properties or objects 
are vague in themselves, or that it is an indeterminate matter whether or not 
an object instantiates a property.
Keefe and Smith explicitly make the observation that «several... 
authors dismiss the notion of vagueness in the world, maintaining that it 
does not even make sense»73. Bertrand russell also implies that vagueness 
70. KeeFe and sMith, «introduction: Theories of Vagueness», p. 50.
71. Peter van inwaGen, Book review of Peter Unger’s Identity, Consciousness and 
Value, in Noûs 27, no. 3 (Sept. 1993): pp. 377-378. For further arguments on his thesis 
on the conceptual impossibility of establishing the boundaries of things by convention, 
see Peter van inwagen, Material Beings (ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 
pp. 6-12. 
72. Friesen, «Vagueness, moral obligation, and van inwagen’s Defense of Theism 
from the local argument from Evil», p. 15.
73. KeeFe and sMith, «introduction: Theories of Vagueness», p. 16.
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cannot be a feature of the world itself because «vagueness and precision 
alike are characteristics which can only belong to a representation, of which 
language is an example... apart from representation, whether cognitive or 
mechanical, there can be no such thing as vagueness or precision; things 
are what they are, and there is an end of it»74. michael Dummett adds that 
«the notion that things might actually be vague, as well as being vaguely 
described, is not properly intelligible»75.
in short, if most philosophers are not sympathetic to ontic vagueness 
and they have good reasons for doing so, then employing this account of 
vagueness to a van-inwagen-type free-will defense against the local argu-
ment from evil would be costly for the theist, especially in van inwagen’s 
methodological context of an imaginary debate before an audience of ag-
nostics. if the ideal agnostics can be reasonably imagined to react as most 
philosophers do to ontic vagueness (i.e., find it simply improbable, and even 
false), then a defense employing this account of vagueness would be in dan-
ger of being judged a failure in refuting the atheist’s local argument from 
evil.
Thus far, we have shown that van inwagen’s Theist’s defense against 
the local argument definitely rejects epistemicism because this account of 
vagueness forces van inwagen either to abandon his grant to atheist that 
gratuitous evils exist, or that it leads van inwagen to admit that the wrong-
ness of the moral principle appealed to by atheist is not proven after all, 
since an omniscient God can hardly be imagined as unable to know the 
precise extensions of natural language terms if these in fact exist. But then 
alternative (non-epistemic) accounts of vagueness, when used as the frame-
work for van inwagen’s defense, have their own problematic consequences, 
too. The supervaluationist (indecision view), as well as the indeterminist 
account of vagueness, leads to the unacceptable proposition that God is se-
mantically or intentionally undecided, while ontic-vagueness accounts are 
philosophical «non-starters» and would be costly for theists in the debate 
against atheists.
in short, there is a need to continue examining the available accounts 
of vagueness (or to create new accounts76) and see whether they make better 
74. Bertrand rUssell, «Vagueness», in Vagueness: A Reader, ed. rosanna Keefe 
and Peter Smith (Cambridge, massachusetts: The miT Press, 1996), p. 62.
75. michael dUMMett, «Wang’s Paradox», in Vagueness: A Reader, ed. rosanna 
Keefe and Peter Smith (Cambridge, massachusetts: The miT Press, 1996), p. 111.
76. Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč speak of several central and unresolved issues 
in vagueness (e.g., «Does vagueness apply to language and thought exclusively, or does 
it genuinely exist in the world? Should one aim to eventually supplement vagueness by 
precise terms, or is vagueness ineliminable in principle? What is the proper diagnosis of 
the infamous sorites paradox? Should classical two-valued logic be modified in order to 
accommodate vagueness, and if so how?»). Terry horGan and Matjaž Potrč, «Vague-
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partners with a van-inwagen-type defense that insists on using vagueness as 
a key feature and on granting the existence of gratuitous evils. The current 
unresolved questions concerning vagueness must lead the theist who insists 
on featuring vagueness in his defense, especially if he also uses van inwa-
gen’s ideal debate before agnostics as methodology, to be more cautious in 
his claims – as the following section suggests.
3.4. limiting the Claims of Vagueness Defenses
as we have just seen, making a stand – as van inwagen does – that 
the minimum amount of evils necessary for the atonement is vague to God 
(just as it is to us) would unnecessarily commit one to either of the following 
problematic theses:
1.  it is metaphysically impossible for an omnipotent, omniscient God 
to know the precise boundaries between the terms «evils neces-
sary for the success of the atonement» and «evils not necessary 
for the success of the atonement» even if such boundaries exist.
2.  it is metaphysically impossible for an omnipotent, omniscient God 
to know the precise boundaries between the terms «evils neces-
sary for the success of the atonement» and «evils not necessary 
for the success of the atonement» because there simply are no 
such precise boundaries.
of course, the first thesis is immediately objectionable on the ground 
that an omniscient God would know about everything that exists, if it exists 
at all. But then, it is possible for a theist to make the distinction between 
God’s not knowing something and God’s not foreknowing something. a the-
ist, for example, can offer a defense along the following lines: in the same 
way that it is possible for the omniscient God not to have foreknowledge of 
the free acts of creatures (and it was His free choice that this should be so77), 
so – it might be argued – is it also possible for God not to have foreknowl-
edge of the precise extension of the term «amount of evils necessary for 
the success of the atonement» insofar as God has freely decided to invite 
human beings to be His free partners and co-operators in the success of the 
atonement. God, in His mercy and love, has chosen to make human beings 
His free co-workers in bringing creation to perfection and making the world 
an «evil-free zone» as much as possible.
ness: From Epistemicism to Transvaluationism», Acta Analytica 17, no. 29 (2002): p. 7. 
See the different articles on vagueness in this issue of Acta Analytica edited by Horgan 
and Potrč. See also the papers from the 1998 conference on Vagueness in Bled, Slovenia, 
published in Acta Analytica 14, no. 23 (1999).
77. Cfr. swinbUrne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, pp. 3-4.
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in that way, both Creator and free creatures affect the final exten-
sion of the term «exact amount of evils that was necessary for the success of 
the atonement for all human beings who ever existed and were significantly 
free». it may be added that at the end of time, when all evils shall have come 
to pass, God will know (it will no longer be vague to Him) how many evils 
were necessary to at least provide the necessary condition for the atonement 
of all human beings there ever were whom God actually allowed to exercise 
their freedom significantly. (of course, some of these, possibly, would freely 
reject God forever.) The extension of the terms will be clear by then, since 
God will have known all free human acts (and their consequences) that hu-
mans will have done until the accomplishment of the atonement78.
The second thesis above [i.e., that God’s vagueness is explained by the 
no-precise-boundaries thesis] raises the question why even God’s concepts 
and terms do not have precise extensions. Each of the different non-epistemic 
accounts of vagueness highlights a possible explanation for the phenomenon 
of vagueness among human beings. But, as we have seen, each explanation 
becomes problematic when dealing with a supposed divine vagueness. Thus, 
as long as no successful explanation is given on how an omniscient God (not 
just human beings) should be vague about such important matters as how 
much evil to allow in order to achieve His purposes at the least cost, a defense 
that explicitly includes the thesis that «God is vague about the amount of evils 
necessary for the atonement» leaves much to be desired.
my suggestion is: Since featuring one available account of vague-
ness to the exclusion of the other accounts in a van-inwagen-type defense 
against the local argument has such costly consequences for the theist, why 
not leave open the question on whether or not the matter is vague to God, 
and make only a limited claim, namely, that the matter is vague at least to 
humans, whether or not it is to God? While van inwagen explicitly rejects 
epistemicism, a theistic defense featuring vagueness need not make this 
claim. But neither does it endorse epistemicism to the exclusion of the other 
accounts of vagueness.
Thus, we have the following proposals:
3.4.1.  A Defense Appealing Only to the Vagueness of the Matter
 to Humans
i propose that the following alternative vagueness-based defense 
against the local argument avoids the complications of a vagueness-based 
78. For example, among the significantly free acts of humans are procreation and 
development of the temporal world in certain ways. i will pursue the possibilities of 
this response below under the section «a Defense appealing to God’s Freely-Chosen 
Vulnerability».
330 BENEDiCTo Po Tao
defense that explicitly rejects epistemicism, such as van inwagen’s. i es-
pecially highlight that «vagueness» in the proposition below [Proposition 
(15)] is meant to claim only the vagueness of the matter to human beings. 
it makes no stand at all in regard to the issue whether the matter on «the 
amount of evil necessary for the success of God’s atonement Plan» is also 
vague to God. of course, not making any stand on this matter no longer 
advances the strategy of van inwagen, which includes as an essential step 
the exposition of the wrongness of the standard position on evil (SP) as a 
basic moral principle. But of course, making a stand on this issue is not 
necessary at all in a defense or in a theodicy which attempts to «justify the 
ways of God before human criticism».
i intend the following proposition to be a modification of van inwa-
gen’s Theist’s Proposition (14).
Proposition (15): it is plausible to suppose that the actual state of af-
fairs of the actual world is one
(15a)  where God is justified in the non-prevention of a certain 
amount of evils in accordance with an atonement Plan for 
separated humans, but where the exact amount, type of dis-
tribution, and membership of the instances of non-preventions 
(of evil) necessary for divine purposes (e.g., the atonement) 
are vague to human beings79;
(15b)  where, therefore, it is a vague issue to human beings whether 
a given particular evil should or shouldn’t be a part of that set 
of instances of non-preventions (of evil) necessary for divine 
purposes (e.g., the atonement); and
(15c)  where, therefore (given the vagueness of the matter to human 
beings), no human being can legitimately charge God of moral 
imperfection simply on the ground that He did not in fact pre-
vent this one particular instance of evil.
i highlight the differences between this proposition and its par-
allel proposition, van inwagen’s Theist’s Proposition (14). in (14a), van 
inwagen’s proposes that the minimum amount of evil necessary for the 
atonement is vague to the moral agent God, which vagueness de facto 
«excuses» Him from acting according to atheist’s supposed basic mor-
al principle SP, just as human agents in similar situations of vagueness 
are also excused from acting according to this standard position on evil 
SP. But while van inwagen’s Proposition (14) is intended to show (as in 
79. rather than talk of «evils necessary for divine purposes», i prefer the expression 
«the non-preventions (of evils) necessary for divine purposes». The parentheses serve to 
clarify that i intend the adjective «necessary» to modify «divine non-preventions of some 
amount of evil», rather than «evils».
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his Proposition [3]) that SP is therefore wrong as a basic moral principle 
on the ground that there are situations where the agents preventing and 
allowing certain evils cannot be reasonably obliged to abide by SP, my 
(15a) does not make a stand whether the amount of evils necessary for the 
atonement is vague to God.
Naturally, my Proposition (15) doesn’t have to be an instance of The-
ist’s Proposition (3) and thus will have nothing to do with showing the cor-
rectness or wrongness of SP. But a theistic defense using vagueness is not 
required to show that SP is wrong. and so i intend «vague» in my (15a) to 
mean only that «the exact amount, type of distribution, and membership of 
the instances of non-preventions (of evils) necessary for divine purposes is 
vague to human beings». in effect, my (15a) is also saying that any line that 
God draws between evils He prevents and evils He allows would always 
look arbitrary to humans.
But since no stand is made on whether the amount of evil necessary 
for the success of the atonement is also vague to God (15a) does not in ef-
fect make a stand on whether the line that God draws also looks arbitrary 
to Him such that He then doesn’t have any non-arbitrary guide by which He 
can make a specific non-arbitrary decision in regard to preventing or allow-
ing a particular evil.
as already noted under «The No-minimum argument», there are 
at least two senses in which to understand the statement that «there is no 
non-arbitrary line that God can draw». The first sense says only that there is 
no line that God can draw that does not look arbitrary to those who evalu-
ate God’s moral accountability and by which they can judge whether God 
acted wrongly or justifiably in not preventing a particular evil. The second 
sense includes the first and says in addition that there is also no line that 
can be drawn that does not look arbitrary to God Himself and by which He 
can make a specific decision in regard to preventing or allowing a particular 
evil.
Because of the costly consequences of presupposing that «the amount 
of evils necessary for the atonement» is vague to God and that therefore 
there is no non-arbitrary line that He can draw (in the second sense), i pro-
pose that only the first sense should be insisted – while the second sense 
may be left open – by a van-inwagen-type defense that uses an account of 
vagueness.
on the one hand, a theistic defense using the idea of the impossibil-
ity of God drawing a non-arbitrary line in the first sense claims only that 
human beings, who are vague about the extension of «the evils necessary 
for the success of the atonement plan», cannot legitimately charge God of 
moral imperfection on the ground that He did not prevent this particular 
evil. This would hold true whether one employed an epistemic or a non-
epistemic account of vagueness. Under an epistemic framework, a theistic 
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defense using vagueness may suppose: a) that nothing is vague to God be-
cause, being omniscient, He would have known the precise boundaries of 
the phrase «amount of evil necessary for the atonement»; and b) that this 
matter is, understandably, vague to us epistemically limited human beings. 
Under the indecision view, this matter is still vague to us on account of our 
semantic indecision due to a failure to precisify our terms, but now the the-
istic defender avoids the complications of representing God as semantically 
undecided, since in the first place, nothing is claimed at all about anything 
being vague to God.
on the other hand, a theistic defense using the idea of the impossibil-
ity of God drawing a non-arbitrary line in the second sense makes the un-
necessary additional claim – unnecessary, i.e., for the purposes of giving a 
defense – that even God (who Himself is vague about the extension of «evils 
necessary for the success of the atonement») cannot have a non-arbitrary 
choice where to put the line between evils He prevents and evils He allows. 
as we have seen, making this additional claim pushes the theist as well as 
his audience of agnostics to a non-epistemic account of vagueness – with 
such costly consequences.
of course, what a defense requires is only that human criticism 
against the ways of God would be refuted, and in the present context, this 
means only refuting a certain argument raised by humans who are vague 
about the boundaries of evils necessary and evils unnecessary for divine 
purposes. The issue is then simply whether or not it is legitimate for hu-
mans, to whom this matter is vague, to morally accuse God. There is no 
necessity to make a stand on whether this matter is also vague to God. 
moreover, when a defense insists on making the unnecessary move of tak-
ing the stand that this matter is also vague to God, it would be committing 
itself to a particular account of vagueness, which may cost it its credibility 
before those who don’t consider this account of vagueness plausible at all. 
and of course, there is no reason to suppose that everyone in van inwagen’s 
ideal audience of agnostics would unanimously consider one particular ac-
count of vagueness to be probable at all.
Hence, with the above clarifications, i propose that if (15a) in Propo-
sition (15) is plausibly true, regardless of whether the epistemic or the inde-
cision view of vagueness is used as theoretical framework (15b) and (15c) 
would logically follow. if atheists insist on accusing theists of believing in 
a non-omnipotent or in a morally imperfect God on the basis of this single 
un-prevented evil (e.g., the murder of mari luz), the defense may well ap-
peal to the principle of presumption of innocence: «The accused is innocent 
unless proven guilty». Human accusers (atheists) as well as human judges 
(the audience of agnostics) cannot of course «convict» theism of inconsis-
tency on the basis of a vague accusation, something that none of them can 
establish.
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regardless, therefore, of whether or not the issue on the exact 
amount, type of distribution, and membership of non-preventions (of evils) 
necessary for divine purposes is vague only to humans (i.e., they are not 
necessarily vague to God), those who accept that the minimum amount of 
evils consistent with God’s plan is vague at least to humans cannot convict 
theism of holding inconsistent beliefs on the simple ground that one particu-
lar instance of evil was not prevented.
3.4.2. A Defense Appealing to God’s Freely-Chosen Vulnerability
Finally, there’s a line of thinking suggested by ontic vagueness 
which, in my judgment, has good chances at succeeding when pursued more 
elaborately. God’s vagueness – to the extent that it can be granted that God 
can be vague about anything at all – is, according to the lines suggested by 
ontic vagueness, due to the fact that this vagueness is fundamentally related 
to the nature of the world that God has morally sufficient reasons for creat-
ing as it is. Now, what is the nature of the world that God has freely created? 
or, at least, what may be one of its fundamental features? one feature of the 
actual world is that it is a world where there are free human beings whom, in 
accordance with His plan, God would allow to exercise significant freedom 
both in their moral choices and amoral choices.
among the choices that some human beings can make and whose 
carrying out God does not prevent (or at least, not all the time, granted 
that God does make a few miraculous interventions here and there for 
His own good reasons) is the exact number of offspring they will procre-
ate in their lifetime. These offspring, since they in turn will be allowed 
by God to be significantly free, will in turn decide on the number of 
offspring they will bear in their lifetime. This goes on until the consum-
mation of the world (whether such consummation will be due to a special 
intervention from God and to what extent, or simply due to the world’s 
taking its due course and reaching its natural end according to the nor-
mal functioning of its natural laws). Since individual human beings are 
directly responsible for some good and evil in the world, and would in 
turn be the subject of some evils, there is no telling how many evils and 
what varieties there would be in the world from its beginning until its 
consummation.
The final amount of evils – as well as, correspondingly, the total 
amount of good – in the world thus depends (it was God’s will that it should 
depend) partly on the free decisions of human beings. if human beings are 
to remain significantly free and God does not set a predetermined amount 
of evil such that when humans shall have brought about this much amount 
of evil He would destroy the world, then the exact total amount of evils up 
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to any given time since the beginning of the world was something that God 
could not have foreknown. This is simply a logical consequence of the con-
cession (which van inwagen makes) in regard to the traditional concept of 
omniscience. Divine omniscience, van inwagen proposes, does not include 
foreknowledge of creaturely free acts.
Consequently, granted that God could not have foreknown the exact 
total number of humans and the total amount of good and evil they would 
freely do and thus the total amount of consequent evil and suffering they 
would be subjects of up to any given time since the beginning of the world, 
neither could God have foreknown the total amount (and exact distribution) 
of non-preventions (of evils) necessary to bring about a logically necessary 
condition for the success of the atonement Plan.
No matter what the omnipotent God does to increase the probability 
of His creatures making the right choice, He cannot logically enforce or 
ensure that every human being would freely return to Him. and it’s possible 
that some human beings would not make it their final choice to be united 
with God, and so they remain in an eternal state of separation from God, 
which is called «Hell». James l. Crenshaw calls this God’s «freely chosen 
vulnerability».
in choosing to endow humans with self-determination, the deity has 
relinquished full exercise of power and knowledge: human freedom entails 
divine constraint. moreover, by entering into covenant relationship with 
particular human beings, he has made himself vulnerable, subject to the 
uncertainty of human choice. Vulnerability belongs to the essence of any 
intimate relationship, which must be grounded in mutual freedom. God’s 
relationship with the creatures made in his own image bears the painful 
scars of this freely chosen vulnerability... Divine vulnerability [is] a divine 
dependence on reciprocal love that cannot be ascertained unless submitted 
to radical choice80.
if God is justified in giving the gift of freedom at all, then He is justi-
fied in allowing a necessary condition for there to be creaturely freedom at 
all, namely, the possibility that such a freedom might be abused. That such 
a freedom might possibly be abused is not evil in itself. its actual abuse 
constitutes moral evil. But the actual abuse of this freedom by the creature 
is, of course, not necessary for this freedom to be there. and it was not part 
of God’s plan that freedom should be abused by the creature.
and so, we see here that a variant of ontic vagueness can be used 
in a defense of theism against local arguments from evil in just this sense: 
80. James l. crenshaw, Defending God: Biblical Responses to the Problem of Evil 
(oxford: oxford University Press, 2005), p. 82.
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The vagueness of the matter concerning the amount of non-preventions 
(of evils) necessary for the success of the atonement is in great part due 
to the fundamental nature of the world that God freely created – a world 
in which it is God’s will that there be intelligent creatures significantly 
exercising their freedom (for the immensely outweighing good that only 
freedom can make possible, namely, creaturely love, the love of creatures 
for their Creator, and the love of creatures for one another in God). inso-
far as God could not have foreknowledge of freely-willed creaturely acts, 
God could not have foreknowledge that creatures would actually do evil 
at all in the first place, or, if they would, how much evil they would do. 
Consequently, there could not have been any foreknowledge of the «exact 
amount of evil God leaves in place to provide a necessary condition for the 
success of the atonement».
other variables come into play – such as the psychology, the temper-
ament, the culture, personal experiences, etc. of an individual person – all 
of which condition (but not determine) the free acts of individuals. The past 
free choices of an individual increase the probability (but not determine) the 
way he makes present choices. Consequently, the exact extent of the work 
of motivating individual human beings (including, e.g., how much suffer-
ing that is the natural consequence of a wrong choice must be left in place) 
to make a loving return to God is also something that God could not have 
foreknown.
We note that this defense of theism still appeals to the vagueness 
of the matter concerning «the amount of non-preventions (of evils) neces-
sary to provide a necessary (though insufficient) condition for the success 
of the atonement Plan for fallen humans», and – more importantly – that 
this matter is vague to God. Hence, this defense is compatible with van in-
wagen’s strategy of showing the wrongness of the standard position on evil 
(the moral principle appealed to by atheist). But the stress here is that this 
vagueness on the part of God is due to His free decision to create a world 
in which some intelligent creatures exercise their freedom significantly. it 
is also due to His free decision to entrust the stewardship of creation to hu-
man beings. That is to say, human beings can freely exercise their freedom 
in caring for the world in their own creative ways (such ways as they would 
gradually discover) in accordance with God’s plan. God ensures this by not 
foreknowing their free actions. again, this is, in a manner of speaking, part 
of «God’s freely-chosen vulnerability».
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4.  the anti-irreGUlarity deFense aGainst the arGUMent FroM 
extra-extra-laPsarian evils
The human person is radically different from everything else in the 
created world. Hence, it is not implausible for the theist to suppose that in 
allowing human sufferings God may have reasons that are different from 
those He has for allowing evils that have nothing to do with the intentional 
actions of human agents to befall on the rest of creation, if there are such 
evils.
it may or may not be that beasts suffer (or that pre-lapse beasts suf-
fered) and it may or may not be that the general biological mechanism of 
pain is evil, but if animal suffering is treated as an evil (both before and 
after the alleged Fall), then the atheist can use this to present an argument 
from «the evil of bestial suffering». Theism has to be defended against the 
argument from these alleged evils, which, by definition, are not covered by 
the free-will defense.
a preliminary question is: is it possible for there to be a good created 
world containing no evil whatsoever? or, since «evil» in the previous ques-
tion is rather misleading, is it possible for there to be a good created world 
without the following features: some things lack (or have to a lesser degree) 
some of the things that other things have, and some forms are generated at 
the expense of the corruption of other forms? Would these lacks and losses 
and relative imperfections be «evil»?
4.1.  are «metaphysical Evils» Extra-lapsarian Evils?
Given our definition of «evil», what leibniz and others would call 
metaphysical evil would not really count as an evil, because we take it that 
all parties agree that «evils» would only be those «absences or lacks of 
something that, according to a system of evaluation that one takes to be 
objective and universal, ought to be there». «metaphysical evil», however, 
refers to the basic fact of finitude81, of there being «order and hierarchy of 
different degrees of perfection (or imperfection)» in the universe82. in the 
context of leibniz’ Theodizee, it refers to the «ontological imperfection of 
all created things in comparison with the perfection of God»83. it is a thing’s 
81. John hicK, Evil and the God of Love, 2nd ed. (london: macmillan, 1977), pp. 
13-14.
82. Paul weinGartner, Evil: Different Kinds of Evil in the Light of Modern Theod-
icy (Frankfurt am main: Peter lang, 2003), p. 9.
83. armin Kreiner, Dios en el sufrimiento: Sobre la solidez de los argumentos de la 
teodicea [Gott im leid], trad. roberto H. Bernet de la nueva edición ampliada, Friburgo 
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essential limitation as that thing and as distinct from other things. «meta-
physical evil» is therefore not a description of something that is not there 
which ought to be there. The lion’s incapability to fly constitutes no evil (ac-
cording to the above definition) since the ability to fly is not something that, 
according to a system of evaluation that one takes to be objective and uni-
versal (e.g., evaluation of a particular lion from the standard of a supposed-
to-be-universal-and-objective leonine nature), ought to be there.
The essential variety and gradation of things can only be made pos-
sible by «metaphysical evil». individuals of a certain species lack (or pos-
sess to an essentially lesser degree) what belongs to individuals of another 
species. But given our working definition of evil, this variety and gradation 
would not constitute an evil, properly speaking. St. augustine says in the 
City of God:
[N]o nature at all is evil, and this is a name for nothing but the want 
of good. But from things earthly to things heavenly, from the visible to the 
invisible, there are some things better than others; and for this purpose are 
they unequal, in order that they might all exist84.
Seen in the context of the whole good universe, such potentially de-
structive individual things and organisms as fire, frost, wild beasts, etc. are, 
in augustine’s words, admirable in their own places, excellent in their own 
natures, beautifully adjusted to the rest of creation, serviceable, and grace-
ful in their contributions as to a commonwealth. St. Thomas aquinas adds:
The judgment... of the goodness of anything does not depend upon 
its order to any particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself, and on 
its order to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly 
ordered place85.
de Brisgovia-Basilea-Viena 2005 (Barcelona: Herder Editorial, S. l., 2007), p. 35, quo-
ting G. W. leibniz, Theodizee, i, 21.
84. St. aUGUstine, City of God, Bk. Xi, chap. 22, excerpted in The Problem of Evil: 
Selected Readings, ed. michael l. Peterson (Notre Dame, indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1992), p. 194.
85. Summa Theologica, part i, q. 49, a. 3. See also part i, q. 21, a. 1, which argues 
that «God exercises justice, when he gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and 
condition». See also Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. i, chap. lXXi: «The good of the whole 
is of more account than the good of the part. Therefore, it belongs to a prudent governor 
to overlook a lack of goodness in a part, that there may be an increase of goodness in the 
whole... Now, if evil were taken away from certain parts of the universe, the perfection of 
the universe would be much diminished, since its beauty results from the ordered unity of 
good and evil things, seeing that evil arises from the failure of good, and yet certain goods 
are occasioned from those very evils through the providence of the governor... Therefore, 
evil should not be excluded from things by the divine providence». Summa Contra Gen-
tiles, trans. Joseph rickaby, S. J. (london: B. Sc. oxon., 1905).
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indeed, the distinction and graded order of things is indispensable 
for the perfection of the universe. There would have been no perfection in 
the universe without the perfection of those beings that make up the uni-
verse, and it is necessary that each thing be put in its proper order and grade 
of being. Their specific place in the whole order, i.e., their specific grade of 
being, is at the same time that which fully gives them sufficient reason to be 
part of the complex whole86.
moreover, for all we know, the corruption of some substantial forms 
(e.g., this fawn burned to ashes by this forest fire; or this deer devoured by 
this lion) and the generation of others are also necessary features of any 
physical world run according to natural laws – especially a world where 
there are living sentient organisms. if so, then the general phenomenon of 
corruption and generation in the physical world does not involve losses or 
absences of things that ought to be there, especially if it is plausible to sup-
pose there is some intrinsic good in there being such a physical world.
i propose, and subsequently defend, that a nearly regular physical 
world run according to indeterministic quantum mechanical laws – where 
some things are corrupted and others are generated – is the best eventual 
temporary dwelling place, if not the only possible one, for incoming rational 
beings to be able to perform genuinely free moral choices. This, however, 
leads to more questions, which we will address in their proper places: Why 
must there be non-human animals at all, or at least why must there be pre-
human animals at all? Why did God not create beasts simultaneously with 
humans? Why are there too many animal lives that appear to contain more 
bad than good?87. in short, if the whole world is made by God to be the 
temporary dwelling place of rational beings, why must the stage be set up 
at such an expense as millions of years of ancestral suffering? These objec-
tions have been raised and we will address them presently.
That corruption and generation are indispensable in a physical world 
run according to natural laws – supposing that this is true – has obviously 
nothing to do with any alleged misuse of human freedom. indeed our re-
86. Ángel luis González, Ser y participación: Estudio sobre la cuarta vía de Tomas 
de Aquino, 3ª edición revisada y ampliada (Pamplona: EUNSa, 2001), p. 86.
87. Keller offers the following example which he takes from Jay mcDaniel, Of God 
and Pelicans (louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1989), pp. 19-20. accord-
ing to mcDaniel, white pelicans usually lay two eggs, the second one coming two days 
after the first egg was laid. in due time the first egg hatches two days ahead of the second, 
which serves as a sort of a «back-up egg». The older sibling usually kicks the younger 
sibling out of the nest. The younger «back-up» sibling usually dies of hunger or exposure 
if the first one survives. only when the first one dies does the younger sibling receive the 
full attention of the mother. Keller concludes that the life of the younger sibling seems 
to be a good example of an animal life that contains more bad than good. See Keller, 
Problems of Evil and the Power of God, p. 27.
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sponse includes the following proposition: Consistent with God’s eternal 
plan, the paradise-world of the pre-lapse humans already contained the 
phenomenon of predation among non-human animals and the corruption 
and generation of forms involved in it. But then, if this is indispensable 
for the perfection of the universe, then obviously the permanent organic 
existence of an individual creature would not be something that ought to be 
there, and therefore the fact itself of its corruption involves no evil (accord-
ing to the definition of «evil» agreeable to all parties in the discussion).
i suggest that «evil» in the following quotation from aquinas – which 
he uses to refer to the natural phenomena of corruption and generation of 
things – expresses what is usually referred to as «metaphysical evil».
God and nature and any other agent make what is best in the whole, 
but not what is best in every single part, except in order to the whole... and 
the whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more 
perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God 
not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because «it belongs to Providence 
not to destroy, but to save nature», as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); but 
it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail; secondly, 
because, as augustine says (Enchir. 11), «God is so powerful that He can 
make good out of evil». Hence many good things would be taken away if 
God permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was 
not corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were 
killed88.
To conclude this section, we note that all parties in the discussion 
– theists, atheists, and real or imaginary agnostics – agree in regard to 
metaphysical evil. Hence, «metaphysical evil» involving beasts – whether 
it refers to the fact of variety and gradation in the non-human animal world 
or to the general phenomenon of corruption and generation of non-human 
animal forms as exemplified in the phenomenon of predation – does not 
figure anymore in the discussion below.
But, of course, atheists can still mount their argument from alleged 
cases of biologically gratuitous pain and gratuitous animal suffering. This 
will be addressed in its proper place below.
4.2.  against the Global argument from the Sufferings of Beasts
Van inwagen’s anti-irregularity defense tells a story, «true for all 
anyone knows», where God exists and allows beasts to suffer in the same 
88. Summa Theologica, part i, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2.
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ways and amounts as the actual ones. The four key propositions of this 
story are:
(1)  Every world God could have made that contains higher-level sentient 
creatures either contains patterns of suffering morally equivalent to 
those of the actual world, or else is massively irregular.
(2)  Some important intrinsic or extrinsic good depends on the existence of 
higher-level sentient creatures; this good is of sufficient magnitude that 
it outweighs the patterns of suffering found in the actual world.
(3)  Being massively irregular is a defect in a world, a defect at least as great 
as the defect of containing patterns of suffering morally equivalent to 
those found in the actual world.
(4)  The world – the cosmos, the physical universe – has been created by 
God89.
The fourth proposition is a consequence of the main thesis of theism. 
if there is an omnipotent God, then it is by His power that there is a physi-
cal cosmos that comes to be and is conserved in being. and this is nothing 
else but creation and conservation. The first three propositions will now be 
elaborated.
4.2.1.  Moral Equivalence between a Massively Irregular World
          and a World Where Higher-Level Sentient Creatures Suffer
Van inwagen’s higher-level sentient creatures are «animals that are 
conscious in the way in which (pace Descartes) the higher non-human mam-
mals are conscious»90. Whatever the merits of the no-self-consciousness 
thesis and the no-suffering thesis, van inwagen chooses to defend theism 
without having to deny that the higher non-human mammals are conscious 
and that they do suffer. Whether these non-human animals consciously suf-
fer (i.e., there is a rudimentary self that organizes pain sensations) or they 
only have a succession of pain sensations but not a perception of succession, 
the anti-irregularity defense addresses the prima facie difficulty presented 
for theism by both positions.
For van inwagen, two states of affairs are «morally equivalent» 
when there are no morally decisive reasons for preferring one to the other. 
Two patterns of suffering are thus morally equivalent either because they 
are not in any interesting sense comparable or because there is no mor-
ally decisive reason for preferring one to the other (van inwagen’s example: 
89. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 114.
90. Ibid.
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a world containing cancer but no war and a world containing war but no 
cancer). With two morally equivalent states of affairs, there are no morally 
decisive reasons for supposing that one is equal to, the same as, greater in 
value or lesser in value than, the other.
a «massively irregular world» for van inwagen is 1) a world in 
which the laws of nature fail in some massive way because of God’s ubiqui-
tous miracles protecting every higher-level sentient creature from suffering, 
supposedly to bring about a hedonic utopia; or 2) a world that came into ex-
istence five minutes ago but complete with memories of an unreal past; or 3) 
a world in which beasts felt no pain despite the fact that they have the same 
physical structures and exhibit the same pain-behavior of actual beasts.
a «nearly regular» world, on the contrary, would be a world with a 
stable natural order and stable natural conditions91. it is a world run accord-
ing to stable, regularly functioning natural laws, and therefore one that has 
general regularity of sequence. Such a world, according to John Hick, has 
general causal regularities.
[it would] involve, for example, that two solid objects cannot occupy 
the same region of space at the same time, and that a certain degree of heat 
destroys the tissues of the body. But in a world of fixed structure animals 
are liable sometimes to collide with solid obstacles, or to be submerged in 
water or burned by fire, or to fall on hard ground, or become entangled 
with projecting branches and be injured. and if these animal organisms are 
helped to live out their lifespan by a protective sensitivity to pain, which 
prompts them to avoid or retreat from dangerous situations, it is inevitable 
that this mechanism will be used and that they will in the course of their 
lives experience not a little pain92.
When this nearly regular world is suddenly transformed into a mas-
sively irregular world, things will be very different in the irregular world: 
Every pain-producing situation is systematically prevented by constant ad-
justments in nature. The world would be so unstable that pain mechanisms 
of sentient creatures would never even have developed in the first place 
since these are superfluous anyway. God (or a legion of faithful guardian 
angels) would be there to see to it that fire, which gives warmth (and, in 
the case of future rational animals, cooks food and makes metal malleable 
so as to make possible the manufacture of useful implements), suddenly 
becomes harmless every time random events in nature bring it too close to 
living animal flesh. (other miraculous interventions have been suggested: 
91. Cfr. Keller, Problems of Evil and the Power of God, pp. 17 and 25. For van 
inwagen, a nearly regular world is the opposite of a massively irregular world. See The 
Problem of Evil, p. 171, n. 19.
92. hicK, Evil and the God of Love, pp. 304-305.
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God temporarily or permanently alters the nature of animal flesh in such 
a way that it can suddenly withstand prolonged contact with fire; or, God 
could suddenly put a miraculous shield between fire and animal flesh so 
that there never would be any real contact; or, as the fire threatens to burn, 
God suddenly ceases to sustain most of the more energetic photons in ex-
istence93, etc.)
No animal ever drowns or falls from a precipice by accident (or by 
intention, in the case of suicidal rational animals). Water or air suddenly 
loses some of its normal properties whenever some animal is in danger of 
drowning, or else some temporary alteration in the law of buoyancy sud-
denly saves the animal. When some animal falls from a ravine, some mo-
mentary alteration in the laws of gravity sustains the animal in mid-air, or 
some guardian angel suddenly supports the animal so that it may not dash 
its feet against a stone, or the hard surface of the ground instantaneously be-
comes soft as foam at the precise moment when the falling animal touches 
the ground. Sharp objects used to cut food and other hard surfaces miracu-
lously turn blunt when they get into contact with living animal flesh. Such 
properties of things as hardness, softness, texture, combustibility, etc. must 
be continually adjusted according to the exigencies of every random event 
in nature (a falling stone, a biting predator’s teeth, lightning, etc.) so that no 
animal ever suffers any pain and/or suffering.
Hearing all of the above, an objector would most likely butt in and 
ask: But why not indeed?
The issue thus turns into one of implications. at this point, we mere-
ly outline some of the effects of massive irregularity (as we will come back 
to these in more detail under «The Defect of massive irregularity and the 
Good of Near regularity»):
1) in the case of irrational animals, there would neither be the need 
nor the possibility for developing abilities for instinctive adaptation to 
changing circumstances in nature, and this would most likely prevent the 
progress of natural evolution.
2) in the case of rational animals, there would neither be the need 
nor the possibility for reasoned calculation of the events and movements in 
nature.
Consequently, as Hick puts it, there would be
absence of any need to comprehend nature and to learn to predict 
and manipulate its movements. For in a world of continual «special provi-
dences» the laws of nature would have to be extremely flexible: sometimes 
gravity would operate, sometimes not; sometimes boiling water would be 
93. van inwaGen, «The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God», p. 216, 
n. 4.
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hot, sometimes cool; and so on. There could be no sciences, for there would 
be no enduring world structure to investigate94.
Consequently, for rational animals it would be a world where there is 
neither the need nor the possibility for taking personal responsibility. There 
would be «no need for exertion, no kind of challenge, no problems to be 
solved or difficulties to be overcome, no demand of the environment for 
human skill or inventiveness. There would be nothing to avoid and nothing 
to seek; no occasion for co-operation or mutual help; no stimulus to the 
development of culture or the creation of civilization»95.
Van inwagen’s Proposition (1) then proposes this disjunction: «Every 
world God could have created that contains higher-level sentient creatures 
either contains patterns of suffering morally equivalent to those of the ac-
tual world, or else is massively irregular». When God designs a world, the 
laws of nature are either indeterministic or deterministic. it seems impos-
sible, however, that the laws of nature would be deterministic – at least 
according to the theory of quantum mechanics favored by most physicists 
according to which the laws of nature are quantum-mechanical, which is 
essentially indeterministic.
But if they are indeterministic, then, for all anyone knows, any initial 
state of the world in which God plans higher-level sentient creatures would 
eventually exist might eventually be succeeded by states involving vast amounts 
of pain and suffering. moreover, if the laws of nature are indeterministic, then 
it seems impossible that God can fine-tune the initial state of the universe in 
such a way that it would make an eventual hedonic utopia causally inevitable. 
Due to this natural indeterminism, a duplicate universe that is similar to ours at 
the beginning could have evolved differently, but so long as it is run by natural 
laws, and God does not constantly intervene in its natural functioning by ubiq-
uitous omni-protective miracles, there would still be patterns of higher-level 
sentient suffering morally equivalent to those found in the actual world.
it is also reasonable to suppose that if the arbitrary values (at least 
arbitrary to us) of our universe’s physical parameters had been slightly dif-
ferent, the universe wouldn’t have contained intelligent life96. if this is so 
94. hicK, Evil and the God of Love, p. 306.
95. Ibid., p. 307.
96. Cfr. alvin PlantinGa, «Two Dozen (or So) Theistic arguments», retrieved 15 
may 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://philofreligion.homestead.com/files/Theisti-
carguments.html, pp. 5-9. For scientific arguments for the thesis that if the physical con-
stants of our universe had been slightly different, life (especially intelligent life) couldn’t 
have existed, see, for example, B. J. carr and m. J. rees, «The anthropic Principle and 
the Structure of the Physical World», Nature: International Weekly Journal of Science 
278 (12 april 1979): pp. 605-612. Carr and rees argue that «the basic features of galax-
ies, stars, planets and the everyday world are essentially determined by a few microphysi-
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and if our universe is the only model we have for how a universe might 
be designed, then, for all we know, pain is an essential component of the 
natural evolution of higher-level sentient creatures, which are the immediate 
evolutionary precursors of human beings.
Thus, where God creates a world in which there are higher-level sen-
tient creatures, it seems metaphysically impossible for God to prevent the 
suffering or the pain sensations of these sentient creatures except by means 
of ubiquitous miracles thereby bringing about a hedonic utopia, and this 
would make that world massively irregular.
Van inwagen then argues that, as far as we can see, these two states 
of affairs (there being a massively irregular world and there being a regular 
world containing patterns of suffering of higher-level sentient creatures) are 
morally equivalent; there are no morally decisive reasons for God to prefer 
one to the other option. if so, then it is not inconsistent with God’s moral 
perfection to actualize that state of affairs of there being a world in which 
higher-level sentient creatures suffer in ways and amounts morally equiva-
lent to those found in the actual world.
But why must there be higher-level sentient creatures?
4.2.2.  The Good of There Being Higher-Level Sentient Creatures
«Some important intrinsic and extrinsic good depends on the exis-
tence of higher-level sentient creatures; this good is of sufficient magnitude 
cal constants and by the effects of gravitation... [S]everal aspects of our Universe – some 
of which seem to be prerequisites for the evolution of any form of life – depend rather 
delicately on apparent “coincidences” among the physical constants». See also John D. 
barrow and Frank J. tiPler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (New York: oxford 
University Press, 1986); malcolm S. lonGair, Los orígenes del universo [título original: 
The Origins of Our Universe: A Study of the Origin and Evolution of the Contents of our 
Universe, 1991], trans. Tomás González llarena (madrid: alianza Editorial, S. a., 1992), 
chap. 5, pp. 119-139. in Paul Charles Williams Davies, Cosmic Jackpot: Why Our Uni-
verse Is Just Right for Life (New York: Houghton mifflin Co., 2007), esp. pp. 129-150, 
Davies focuses on the so-called «Goldilocks factor» – the fitness of the universe for life 
– and argues that if the strength of any one of the four forces of nature (the strong and the 
weak nuclear forces, gravitation, and electromagnetism) and the masses of the various 
sub-atomic particles had been altered, even by a small amount, the universe would have 
been rendered sterile. in another book, Paul C. W. Davies cites scientists George Simpson 
and Stephen Jay Gould as saying in effect that if some catastrophe were to wipe out all 
intelligent life on Earth and leave only microbes, it seems unlikely that these microbes 
would then follow a broadly similar evolutionary development and replay the emergence 
of fish, vertebrates, reptiles, mammals, and eventually intelligent bipeds. «There is little 
reason why life should go beyond the level of microbes, and no expectation whatever 
that it will advance obligingly towards intelligence and consciousness, still less develop 
humanoid characteristics». Paul Charles Williams davies, The Origin of Life [first pub-
lished as The Fifth Miracle, 1998] (london: Penguin Books, 2003), pp. 254-255.
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that it outweighs the patterns of suffering contained in the actual world». 
Van inwagen simply regards the following as obvious: a world containing 
higher-level sentient beings would have a much larger amount of intrinsic 
good than a world in which the highest organisms were worms.
moreover, van inwagen also suggests the extrinsic value of there be-
ing higher-level sentient creatures: intelligent creatures made in the image 
and likeness of God cannot evolve directly from the lower animals such as 
worms or oysters; their immediate predecessors must be animals possessing 
higher-level sentience97. But God has morally sufficient reasons for creating 
rational beings made in His image and likeness, namely, to communicate ad 
extra His goodness and love and invite rational creatures to share an eter-
nity of love and happiness in union with Him. Therefore, God is justified to 
actualize that state of affairs where the immediate predecessors of rational 
beings would be higher-level sentient creatures.
The above suggestion, however, to my judgment, invites the follow-
ing objection: it seems to underestimate the omnipotence of the God Who 
can «make descendants of abraham out of stones». if God is omnipotent, 
why can’t He a fortiori bring it about that intelligent creatures made in His 
image and likeness spring directly from worms and oysters – granted that 
there is indeed some intrinsic value in there being such intelligent crea-
tures? That would have saved the sentient world a lot of evolutionary pain 
and suffering. Besides, if a defense is to include anyway the thesis that the 
genesis of rationality involved a special miracle from God, why didn’t God 
perform this special miracle earlier in the evolutionary line? Why didn’t 
God perform the miracle of ontological change from worm to human being 
rather than from the last non-human primate to human being?
is the theist going to say that this cannot be because this would have 
involved so grand a miracle as to cause massive irregularity in the animal 
world? if that is so, then the theist would have to say explicitly that the 
miracle involving the genesis of rationality must be so minimal that it will 
not forfeit the good of there being a regular world in which there are sen-
tient beings. But then the resources of an omnipotent God seem to indicate 
that it would not involve a grand miracle, one that forfeits near regularity, 
for Him to bring it about that rational beings descend directly from worms 
and oysters.
To answer this objection, i think the theist’s most promising re-
joinder would be to appeal to the vagueness of the matter concerning the 
boundaries between the terms «amount of miracles that bring about mas-
sive irregularity» and «amount of miracles that do not bring about mas-
sive irregularity». or perhaps, the theist can say that wherever God puts the 
97. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 120.
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boundaries between the terms «adequate non-human ancestors from which 
human bodies are to evolve directly» and «inadequate non-human ances-
tors from which human bodies are to evolve directly», God cannot but draw 
a morally arbitrary line.
i would then suggest that «adequacy as an ancestor for a human be-
ing» would explore Hick’s concept of epistemic distance. The free rational 
animal, Hick suggests, must be embedded in a larger stream of organic life 
where he feels close affinity with some creatures in the organic world and, 
in this way, be epistemically distant from God, to whom he can then freely 
lift up his mind and heart. it was part of God’s plan that the rational creature 
be embedded in a world where the divine presence «could have been much 
more evident» so that – as Joseph ratzinger says in another context – where 
God is not as manifest as tangible things are in the organic world, the ra-
tional creature may freely encounter God within his own heart98. Thus, for 
there to be the good of epistemic distance, the rational creature must find 
himself in the company of non-human animals. Part of being in company 
with and being biologically related to non-human animals is that the ratio-
nal creature must have evolved from non-human animals.
i then proceed to argue first, van-inwagen-style, that no matter which 
particular species we assign (or God assigns) to be «the most adequate non-
human ancestor from which human bodies are to evolve directly», it is al-
ways possible to have chosen the next lower or the next higher species with-
out significant diminution (or gain) of the good of «adequacy as an ancestor 
for a human being». applying the sorites paradox, use this reasoning to go 
one step at a time down the evolutionary ladder. Somewhere down the lower 
half of any proposed evolutionary history of human beings, however, we 
just intuitively think it is no longer the case that the bodies of certain ani-
mal species would have been adequate candidates for the role of immediate 
predecessors of humans. That is to say, if toads, for example, are to be the 
immediate predecessors of humans, would it be convenient for a rational 
animal to have the body closely similar to that of a toad that remains a toad? 
Would the brain and nervous system of a toad be adequate for rationality? 
if anyone still insists that the answer is yes, i invite him to go lower in the 
evolutionary line and consider worms and jellyfish, and then germs. Would 
these still be adequate candidates for rationality?
No doubt the objector would say that the above paragraph misses 
the point because the point of the objection is that the body of a lower-
level animal, no matter how «inadequate» it may be in its present state as 
a candidate for the office of immediate predecessor of rational beings, can 
98. Cfr. Joseph ratzinGer (Pope benedict XVi), Jesus of Nazareth, trans. adrian J. 
Walker (New York: Doubleday, 2007), pp. 34 and 37.
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easily be transformed by an omnipotent God through a series of miracu-
lous re-arrangements of the particles in the lower-animal’s body so that it 
becomes a higher-level sentient animal’s body in a few seconds. To this 
newly-existing higher-level sentient animal, God could then have infused a 
rational spiritual soul (immediately created by God), and – lo and behold 
– He could have had His first human being right away. This, concludes our 
imaginary objector, would have saved the pre-human animal world a lot of 
ancestral suffering.
To answer this objection, i suggest that «close affinity with some 
creatures in the organic world» is in turn a good quality with no sharp 
boundaries (at least to us humans who discuss arguments from animal suf-
fering). That means – let us suppose that this is correct – there is some 
intrinsic value in there being some «continuities between humans and other 
social animals»99 (namely, its value in bringing about epistemic distance) 
but that this term («affinity» or «continuity») has no precise extensions (at 
least to us).
For all anyone knows, such «close affinity (or continuity) with some 
creatures in the organic world in order that the rational creature might be 
epistemically distant from God» includes that state of affairs where the 
rational creature would be sentient in the way that only the higher-level 
sentient creatures are sentient. more importantly, i suggest in addition, that 
part of this «affinity or continuity to things in the organic world» is that 
such sentience of the future rational animal shall have been the product of 
natural evolution in a world run by regular natural laws, in much the same 
way that the sentience of the higher-level non-human sentient animals also 
naturally evolved. in short, it could plausibly be supposed that God wants 
the rational animal to realize that he (at least his body) was fashioned from 
the elements of the organic world and evolved from them naturally, in the 
same way that his evolutionary predecessors, as well as his contemporary 
animals, evolved naturally.
in the previous sentence i said that God wants the future rational 
animal to realize that «at least his body» evolved naturally from the organic 
world. i would even go farther and say that if certain currents of thought 
are to be granted as correct – (it is not necessary, though, for the effective-
ness of my argument to actually believe and endorse these proposals to be 
correct) – then the extension of the term «the good of there being continu-
ity between humans and other animals» might perhaps include the natural 
evolution of human morality from basic tendencies humans share with other 
social animals.
99. Cfr. Frans de waal, Primates y filόsofos: La evoluciόn de la moral del simio 
al hombre, trans. Vanesa Casanova-Fernández (Barcelona: Paidόs, 2007), pp. 39 and 86.
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according to these currents of thought, morality is not a conscious 
decision adopted by rational animals in a concrete temporal moment; it 
is the product of social evolution, a direct prolongation of social instincts 
that we share with other animals100. Non-human animals are, of course, not 
moral beings insofar as they belong to species that are irrational101. But that 
doesn’t negate the supposition that there are basic tendencies, shared by 
both man and beast, but which in man become occasions to be a moral 
being in a significant way. in many higher-level animals, for example, we 
find instinctive caring for the young and many other tendencies analogous 
to the human tendency to care for others and protect them from harm102. 
my point is that these currents of thought would in fact lend support to my 
argument, at least to the extent that they are correct. in short, «continuity 
with other creatures in the organic world» can signify many things. The 
more human beings are «continuous» with higher-level sentient animals, the 
more it becomes plausible that they ought to have naturally evolved from 
them (as they most probably actually did), and not from worms and oysters. 
according to these currents of thought, the human capacity for compassion, 
empathy, and cooperation with others couldn’t have evolved naturally from 
worms and oysters.
if the above is correct, then the immediate natural evolutionary pre-
decessors of rational animals must be the higher-level sentient creatures, not 
such lower-level sentient animals as toads. in a regular world, converting 
100. Frans de waal, Primates y filόsofos, p. 30. See also Frans B. m. de Waal, 
ed., Tree of Origin: What Primate Behavior Can Tell Us about Human Social Evolution 
(london: Harvard University Press, 2001).
101. i emphasize this point by italicizing «species». on the one hand, chimpanzees 
and other higher-level sentient animals may display such a good degree of animal intel-
ligence and instinctive behavior that an externally similar behavior displayed by human 
beings would have a moral dimension. Studies have shown (those of Samuel Gosling, 
for example) that chimpanzees display behaviors where they can be bribed, can be jeal-
ous, «can be conscientious: they think before they act, they plan and they control their 
impulses», etc. in humanly analogous ways. See Jessica Bennett, «Just like Humans», 
Newsweek, 18 June 2007, p. 52. a study has even proved accordingly that primates have 
a «sense of justice and fairness» analogous to those of humans. See Jaime cUnninGhaM 
and adam Piore, «my Fair monkey», Newsweek, 29 September 2003, pp. 44-45.
on the contrary, infants and mentally retarded human beings might display an ex-
ternal individual incapacity for actual rational and moral behavior. The fact remains, 
however, that there is a huge gap between being human and being non-human. infants 
and mentally retarded people are of a kind (a species) that is capable of rational behavior. 
Chimpanzees which do better than certain humans in certain memory tests and chimpan-
zees which care for their young (more than certain human parents do!) are of a kind (a 
species) that is neither rational nor capable of moral behavior. i owe this point to Carl 
cohen, «The Case for the Use of animals in Biomedical research», in Social Ethics: 
Morality and Social Policy, 5th ed., ed. Thomas a. mappes and Jane S. zembaty (New 
York: The mcGraw-Hill Companies, inc., 1997), pp. 458-467.
102. waal, Primates y filόsofos, pp. 39, 41, 49, 52, 83, and 86.
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higher-level sentient primates (for example) to human beings – i.e., God’s 
giving the bodies of these primates the gift of rationality (along with the 
infusion of a human soul) without doing much else besides in the way of a 
major rearrangement of the particles of their primate bodies – would sat-
isfy the conditions of there being sentience for the new rational animal and 
having had this sentience (and all other natural tendencies that eventually 
would be morally useful for the future rational animal) naturally evolve103.
i may also add that bringing about the existence of rational crea-
tures by natural evolution is more in keeping with the general policy of 
preserving the world’s general causal regularities and thus of the stability 
of the natural order. of course, God could have worked the miraculous on-
tological transformation a step earlier so that the ontological change would 
have been from «the higher-level sentient creature a step lower than the 
apes» to human, instead of from ape to human. That wouldn’t have forfeited 
«natural evolution». But that is precisely the point: the term is vague. and 
if non-epistemicism is correct, the term has no precise extensions, and that 
makes it impossible for there to be a morally non-arbitrary line (at least to us 
humans) dividing natural from unnatural evolution. and, in my judgment, 
that is enough to prohibit any human from accusing God of moral imperfec-
tion for having placed the ontological change exactly where it actually is.
it must be noted, though, that the above paragraphs are meant to 
respond to those who object against God’s having humans descend directly 
from higher-level sentient primates on the ground that God could have done 
it earlier. But so long as it can be agreed by all parties in the discussion that 
some good is achieved by having humans descend directly from higher-
level sentient creatures, and that these creatures are the more adequate evo-
lutionary predecessors of humans than worms and oysters are, then there 
shouldn’t be any need to appeal to some vague feature in a world where this 
state of affairs obtains. (We still need to appeal to vagueness, though, to 
defend the apparently arbitrary divine choice – it looks arbitrary at least to 
us – of the particular higher-level sentient animal species for the office of 
«immediate predecessor of humans»).
if we set aside the vagueness of the matter concerning what exactly 
constitutes a certain species’ being «higher» than another species, then the 
following should also be said: in a world in which God decrees that there 
should be variety and gradation in being and in which God decrees that 
the higher species genetically evolve from among the existent higher-level 
species rather than from among the lower-level ones, then it is only logical 
103. To preempt possible objections, i also suggest that there are no sharp boundar-
ies (at least to us) between «natural evolution» and «unnatural evolution» as well as 
between what constitutes «a major rearrangement of particles in a body» and only «a 
minor rearrangement». 
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that human beings should evolve directly from such higher-level non-human 
primates rather than from worms and oysters. and this connotes millions of 
years of ancestral suffering.
Still, the atheist might object, isn’t a «hedonic utopia» imaginable, 
one where the higher animals evolve from the lower ones but in which God 
miraculously intervenes in order to prevent any case of animal pain or suf-
fering that would have been a necessary part of natural evolution? after all, 
the following state of affairs is conceivable:
God, by means of an ages-long series of ubiquitous miracles, causes 
a planet inhabited by the same animal life as the actual earth to be a hedonic 
utopia. on this planet, fawns are (like Shadrach, meshach, and abednego) 
saved by angels when they are in danger of being burnt alive. Harmful para-
sites and micro-organisms suffer immediate supernatural dissolution if they 
enter a higher animal’s body. lambs are miraculously hidden from lions, 
and the lions are compensated for the resulting restriction of their diets by 
physically impossible falls of high-protein manna, or else, although all liv-
ing things evolved from a common ancestor, a hedonic utopia has existed at 
every stage of the evolutionary process104.
Surely then, continues the objection, some sort of zoological para-
dise totally devoid of animal pain and suffering isn’t logically impossible at 
all. True, this zoological utopia would be massively irregular, but so what?
in the context of his anti-irregularity defense, however, van inwagen 
claims only that there are no morally decisive reasons for supposing that 
massive irregularity is a greater or lesser defect than (or whether in the first 
place it is comparable to) the defect of there being patterns of suffering of 
higher-level sentient creatures such as those displayed in the actual world. 
after all, «the question is whether there is a prima facie case for the thesis 
that the actual sufferings of beasts constitute a graver defect in a world than 
does massive irregularity»105.
advocating a form of modal skepticism, van inwagen says that any-
one who considers the one or the other state of affairs as constituting the 
graver defect would in effect be making an entirely subjective value judg-
ment that has no value at all. it may be that we have a faculty (stemming 
from some combination of gift from God, product of evolution and social 
inculcation) for judging correctly the relative values of states of affairs in-
volving day-to-day practical concerns of human beings (e.g., whether a table 
could be placed in another room). But then our modal intuitions cannot 
be trusted when making modal judgments concerning states of affairs of 
104. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 115.
105. Ibid., p. 121.
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cosmic magnitude. Consequently, anyone’s leanings to one side or the other 
concerning the values of such states of affairs of cosmic magnitude as mas-
sive irregularity in a world or patterns of suffering of higher-level sentient 
creatures would be subjective, unreliable, and untrustworthy.
Undermining van inwagen’s call to modal skepticism when deal-
ing with value judgments on the relative values of cosmic states of affairs, 
Boyce and mcBrayer argue that «God has a prima facie moral obligation to 
actualize a massively irregular world without suffering over a regular world 
with extreme suffering»106 for the former is morally preferable to the latter 
on the following grounds:
a) Clocklike regularity at the expense of millions of years of animal 
suffering is valuable only insofar as it pleases God’s egocentric aesthetic 
sense and would be worse than millions of years of irregularity without the 
sufferings of billions of sentient creatures;
b) alleviating animal suffering costs God nothing or relatively little 
(only a violation of a divine aesthetic concern like the beauty inherent in 
regularity); and
c) By analogy, a dog that experiences severe pain in a regularly 
functioning computerized kennel is worse off than a dog that doesn’t suffer 
at all in an irregularly functioning kennel.
against the view appealed to by Boyce and mcBrayer that clock-
like regularity is valuable only insofar as it satisfies an egocentric God’s 
aesthetic concerns, i point out that there is more to regularity than this view 
suggests! in the first place, there doesn’t seem to me any cause for concern 
that God should be «egocentric», since God Himself is the source, the sus-
tenance in being, and the end of all creation; and of course, God’s being the 
center and goal of creation, unlike creaturely egocentrism, is not incompat-
ible with perfect love ad extra, i.e., His bringing all creatures, with their 
loving cooperation (in the case of rational creatures), to their highest good. 
God Himself is their highest good.
in the second place, i point out that regularity in the world may be 
primarily a necessity for the type of free rational creatures that human be-
ings are to be brought eventually by God, with their loving response, to 
fellowship with Him, in accordance with His plan. it may be that such regu-
larity satisfies somebody’s aesthetic concerns, but it would be of secondary 
importance that a regularity that was necessary for the accomplishment of 
some plan should also be pleasing. in fact, we may well say that God is 
pleased with His creation – «God saw that everything was good» (Gen. 1) – 
insofar as His eternal decrees are being carried out in it just as He planned 
106. boyce and Mcbrayer, «Van inwagen on the Problem of Evil: the Good, the 
Bad and the Ugly», pp. 17-19.
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it. if we can plausibly defend the position that regularity in the world is, for 
all anyone knows, a necessary condition for bringing creatures (especially 
free intelligent creatures called to loving communion with God) to their 
highest good, then even a God who was pleased by creating the regular 
world as He actually did cannot be accused of that kind of selfish indiffer-
ent-to-the-good-of-others egocentrism (very common among creatures) that 
Boyce and mcBrayer allude to.
We will try to defend this position in the next section: massive ir-
regularity frustrates a very good divine plan, while near regularity provides 
a necessary condition for the accomplishment of such a plan.
4.2.3.  The Defect of Massive Irregularity and the Good of Near
           Regularity
reichenbach suggests the following disjunction: Every possible 
world that God could have designed either operates according to natural 
laws or is one that God directs by constant miraculous intervention107. as 
van inwagen points out, however, for all anyone knows, in any world run by 
natural laws that are quantum-mechanical and indeterministic, no amount 
of divine fine-tuning necessarily makes causally inevitable a hedonic uto-
pia totally devoid of any patterns of suffering of higher-level sentient crea-
tures. if some amount of ancestral suffering is a necessary part of evolution 
(granted for the sake of argument that the phenomena of predation and nat-
ural selection through a process of survival-of-the-fittest involve instances 
of «the evil of bestial suffering»), then natural evolution cannot take place 
in a world where all ancestral suffering is prevented by ubiquitous miracles. 
Thus, if God is to totally ensure the non-existence of suffering in a world, 
God would have to run this world by ubiquitous miraculous interventions 
at the price of forfeiting the good of a nearly regular world in which natural 
evolution takes place according to stable natural laws. But a world run by 
ubiquitous divine miracles results in massive irregularity, which is a defect 
in a world.
Van inwagen defines a defect in a world as «a feature of a world that 
(whatever its extrinsic value might be in various worlds) a world is intrinsi-
cally better for not having»108.
Van inwagen proposes that massive irregularity is a defect that is at 
least as great as the defect of there being patterns of suffering of higher-level 
107. Bruce reichenbach, «Natural Evils and Natural laws: a Theodicy for Natural 
Evils», International Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 2 (1976): pp. 187-189.
108. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 115.
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sentient creatures as there are in the actual world. if deists and other think-
ers are right in considering any degree of irregularity in the world as not in 
keeping with God’s power and wisdom, then a fortiori massive irregularity 
is an even greater defect indeed for them. This explains why these thinkers 
tend to dismiss the miraculous.
one, of course, doesn’t have to be a deist to see that massively ir-
regular worlds would also be massively deceptive (e.g., a world that began 
to exist five minutes ago but replete with memories of an unreal past; or a 
world where beasts have the same physical structure and pain-behavior of 
actual beasts but which do not really sense pain). But a world that is mas-
sively deceptive would be inconsistent with a perfect being.
a world that is massively irregular and massively deceptive would 
also render impossible the drawing of even simple conclusions based on 
the assumption of regularity in that world. Thus, if the physical world is to 
be the eventual dwelling place, even if only temporarily, of rational, free, 
and moral beings when they eventually emerge in the scene – we humans 
believe that we now occupy this office – then the pre-human world must be 
prepared in such a way that it becomes the most fitting place for, if not the 
only place compatible with, the existence of such rational beings. But there 
is some reason to think that a world run by naturally indeterministic laws, 
even if no amount of divine adjustments could totally eliminate sentient 
suffering in such a world, is a more fitting place to be the eventual dwelling 
place of rational and moral beings than is a massively irregular world run by 
ubiquitous divine miracles. The totality of the negative consequences (for 
then incoming rational beings) of lack of regularity of sequence in a mas-
sively irregular world provides such a reason.
reichenbach enumerates some such consequences: absence of a 
necessary relation between cause and effect, uncountable variety of events 
following a given set of conditions, impossibility of rational action, impos-
sibility of planning for future events, and the impossibility of rational ex-
pectations, of making predictions, of estimating probabilities, of calculating 
prudence, and of accomplishing rationally conceived goals. Quoting F. r. 
Tennant, reichenbach adds the following consequences: impossibility of 
the accumulation of ordered experience, impossibility of the formation of 
habit, character, culture, and intellectual development. in effect, it becomes 
impossible for there to be moral beings in any significant human way in 
such a world.
Therefore, for a world to be a fitting place for the eventual emer-
gence of rational beings, it must have general regularity of sequence.
it cannot also be the case that God ought to have done the following: 
have a massively irregular world up to the time of the last pre-human ances-
tors and then suddenly have a regular world simultaneous with the sudden 
genesis of rationality. This cannot be the case if we accept the thesis that 
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some intrinsic good can only be achieved by having humans directly descend 
from higher-level sentient primates – e.g., that the higher-level sentience of 
these primates is part of their being «(the most) adequate non-human an-
cestors from which humans are to descend directly»; or that the great good 
of «epistemic distance from God» includes «having basic continuities with 
higher-level sentient creatures» and «having such continuities in the way 
that higher-level non-human animals have their own continuities with lower 
animals, namely, natural evolution». and, of course, for all anyone knows, 
natural evolution and consequently the eventual emergence of the non-human 
sentient predecessors of human beings from their own evolutionary ancestors 
would have been made impossible in a massively irregular world.
moreover, if we take account of the suggestion (mentioned earlier) 
concerning the evolutionary history of the human capacity for morality – at 
least where it concerns the development of certain basic tendencies (shared 
by both man and irrational animals) that in rational man turn out to be oc-
casions for significant moral actions – then i would say that such basic ten-
dencies couldn’t have developed in a massively irregular pre-human world. 
Would mother apes, for example, develop the instinct to feed their young if 
God always and without fail miraculously eliminated all cases of hunger 
pangs among baby apes? likewise, the instinct for self-preservation and 
the motherly instinct for protecting the young wouldn’t have developed in a 
massively irregular world where God miraculously intervenes every time a 
random event of nature (e.g., a falling rock, a flood, a landslide, a predator 
attack, etc.) threatens to destroy a helpless animal. if therefore such basic 
animal instincts are later to be very valuable for the moral lives of eventual 
rational animals, a massively irregular world that makes impossible their 
gradual natural development must really be defective.
in the generally regular world in which rational animals find them-
selves (a world where as a matter of regularity hunger pangs do not miracu-
lously go away when one doesn’t do anything about the hunger), rational 
animals are capable not only of acting according to their animal instincts; 
they are also faced with moral decisions, e.g., to feed or not to feed them-
selves, to care or not to care for their young, to share or not to share food 
with others, etc. They gradually discover that some actions are good (shar-
ing food, refraining from setting another man on fire, etc.) while some ac-
tions (and omissions, e.g., not feeding the young) are evil.
on the contrary, in a world where there is no regularity of sequence 
because God constantly intervenes, «either one could not will evil, or the 
evil which one willed could not be actualized»109. in reichenbach’s example, 
109. reichenbach, «Natural Evils and Natural laws: a Theodicy for Natural Evils», 
pp. 187-188.
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if Delilah is to be prevented from doing evil to Samson and the israelites, 
then God has several options: bring it about that the wine Samson drank 
would not put him to sleep, or bring it about that the scissors Delilah used 
to cut Samson’s hair suddenly became dull, etc. moreover, since Delilah’s 
having some evil thoughts and intentions already constitutes some moral 
evils, then a constantly intervening God would have to prevent these moral 
evils as well by means of some special miracle in Delilah’s nervous system 
or brain state just as she is about to think evil thoughts.
indeed it may be that God, for some reasons, occasionally makes 
these miraculous interventions. But a world in which no one can will evil 
and no one can have the evil he wills actualized would be a world in which 
there is no true freedom of moral choice110. For there to be true creaturely 
freedom of choice, something must really be at stake. a person that decides 
to turn away from God, or harm a fellow person, must really be able to do 
so. massive irregularity brought about by ubiquitous divine miracles makes 
this impossible. Conversely, God’s making impossible the commission of 
such evils increases the massive irregularity of that world.
Therefore, in a world where God wills that there would eventually 
be rational beings significantly exercising their freedom, massive irregu-
larity is a defect, a feature that such a world is intrinsically better for not 
having.
moreover, according to reichenbach, the prevention of all instances 
of evil by means of God’s ubiquitous miraculous interventions brings about 
self-contradictory situations. This holds true, for example, where the very 
thing that is good for one individual creature might not be good for another 
individual creature. in situations where there is scarcity of food, some indi-
vidual animals die of hunger while other individual animals survive. in such 
a situation of scarcity, only a special intervention could have saved all ani-
mals in both groups. otherwise the survival of one group means the death 
of the other. Therefore, if goodness in this situation were simply equated 
with preserving the life of all individual animals, then the normal course 
of nature – without a specific divine intervention for this particular occa-
sion – necessarily brings about a «good» for one group that is not «good» 
for another. God, of course, cannot be morally reproached for this state of 
affairs so long as we remember that the good of the whole created reality 
requires that some individual things in it fail in goodness. at a smaller 
scale, it may indeed be good for the general ecosystem that some individual 
animals die while other individual animals survive. This is simply part of 
nature’s system of check and balances in a world functioning with general 
causal regularities.
110. Cfr. C. S. lewis, The Problem of Pain (Glasgow: Collins, 1940), p. 27.
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among rational animals, C. S. lewis says, there are often situations 
that, owing to the fixed nature of the world, cannot possibly be equally 
convenient and pleasurable to each member of a society. But «this is very 
far from being an evil: on the contrary it furnishes occasion for all those 
acts of courtesy, respect, and unselfishness by which love and good humour 
and modesty express themselves. But [at the same time] it certainly leaves 
the way open to a great evil, that of competition and hostility»111. To bring 
about the great moral good of people sharing and helping one another, God 
must not always modify the behavior of matter to produce unpredictable 
alterations (e.g., one small piece of bread miraculously triples in size to fully 
satisfy three hungry people)112. People, however, often choose to exploit the 
fixed nature of matter to hurt one another (e.g., the strongest or the most 
cunning sometimes takes advantage of the fixed nature of an iron bar to 
beat the two other hungry men to death).
Finally, massive irregularity is also a defect in a world in the sense 
that without God’s constant adjustments such a world immediately dissolves 
into chaos and thus makes impossible the eventual handing over of the gov-
ernment of the world to humanity113. if it is true, as claimed by Christian-
ity, that God’s plan was to entrust the world to the care of human beings, 
then a massively irregular world couldn’t have been the type that could be 
entrusted.
4.3.  against the local argument from the Sufferings of Beasts
The anti-irregularity story is now going to be employed to respond 
to the local argument from the sufferings of beasts, which uses a particular 
episode of bestial suffering, e.g., rowe’s fawn. This response – parallel to 
van inwagen’s response to the local argument from lapsarian evil – likewise 
uses vagueness as a key feature, as well as the no-minimum thesis.
But what of the hundreds of millions (at least) [of gratuitous evils 
such as a burning fawn’s sufferings] that have, no doubt, occurred during 
the long history of life? Well, i concede, [God] could have prevented any 
one of them, or any two of them, or any three of them... without thwarting 
any significant good or permitting any significant evil. But could he have 
prevented all of them? No – not without causing the world to be massively 
111. Ibid., p. 26.
112. a God-man may indeed perform the miracle of the multiplication of loaves (in 
the literal sense) but it is not obvious that his doing this all the time wouldn’t have for-
feited His plan for humanity to grow in love for Him and for one another.
113. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 123.
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irregular. and, of course, there is no sharp cutoff point between a world that 
is massively irregular and a world that is not – just as there is no sharp cutoff 
point between a penalty that is an effective deterrent for armed assault and 
a penalty that is not. There is, therefore, no minimum number of cases of in-
tense suffering that God could allow without forfeiting the good of a world 
that is not massively irregular – just as there is no shortest sentence that a 
legislature can establish as the penalty for armed assault without forfeiting 
the good of effective deterrence114.
Here’s a reconstruction:
(5)  it is possible that the actual state of affairs of the world is one
 (5a)  where: God is justified in the permission of a certain 
amount of evil (e.g., bestial suffering) in order for there 
to be a nearly regular world, but where the amount and 
membership of the instances of non-preventions (of evils, 
such as bestial suffering) necessary for there to be a nearly 
regular world is vague;
 (5b)  where: the vagueness of this matter is due to the fact that 
there are no precise boundaries between the terms «mas-
sively irregular world» and «nearly regular world»;
 (5c)  where: therefore, there is no number n such that (1) if God 
had prevented n (or fewer) of the evils which He in fact 
allowed, there would have been a nearly regular world just 
the same, and (2) if God had prevented n + 1 (or more) of 
those evils from taking place, there would not have been a 
nearly regular world;
 (5d)  where: the prevention of any number, m, of evils would 
not have a significantly different effect from the preven-
tion of m + 1 evils or from m – 1 evils, as regards either 
there being a nearly regular world or there being a mas-
sively irregular world;
 (5e)  where: therefore, no significant overall good and no sig-
nificant overall evil is achieved by the prevention of any 
number, m, of evils which the prevention of m + 1 evils or 
m – 1 evils could not have achieved as well;
 (5f)  where: therefore, there is no minimum amount of evils 
necessary for there to be a nearly regular world; and
 (5g)  where: therefore (given the no-minimum thesis), God is 
not morally obliged to prevent any given instance of evil, 
and thus not morally reproachable for allowing some in-
114. van inwaGen, «The Problem of Evil, the Problem of air, and the Problem of 
Silence», p. 164, n. 11. 
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stance of evil (e.g., rowe’s fawn), that is not necessary for 
there to be a nearly regular world or for the prevention of 
there being a massively irregular world.
(6)  From a vast array of alternative, morally equivalent amounts 
of suffering, God has decreed that some member of this array 
shall be the actual amount of suffering, but has left it to chance 
which member of this array would be the amount that actually 
obtains115.
(7)  any line that God could have drawn between instances of ani-
mal suffering He prevents and instances of animal suffering He 
allows is a morally arbitrary line116.
(8)  The particular evil in question (e.g., rowe’s fawn) simply hap-
pened, for no special reason or explanation at all – other than 
that type of «chance» that has its own place in a world provi-
dently sustained by God – to be on the «actuality» side of the 
morally arbitrary line that God drew.
again, «chance» in the above propositions should be properly under-
stood in the light of what van inwagen says about an event’s happening «by 
chance», namely, that it was not part of God’s eternal plan (or anyone else’s 
plan) that it should take place, and take place at this or that particular time 
and place and with its particular circumstances117. But, of course, there may 
be a general reason why events of that kind happen in general, e.g., God acts 
according to His general policy that He preserves the significant exercise of 
creaturely freedom, or that He runs His regular world – any world that He 
could have created to be the eventual temporary dwelling place of rational 
creatures – by applying naturally indeterministic stable laws upon the initial 
state of the particles of that world.
The next section will argue that while pain sensations, sufferings, 
and organic deaths in a generally regular world hurt individual animals, it is 
probably good for animals in general and for the whole organic world that 
it should be one that contains a regularly functioning pain mechanism. it 
will then argue in the end that God is justified in not preventing all cases of 
biologically gratuitous pain, for if He did, the good of a regularly function-
ing pain mechanism would have been forfeited.
115. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 124.
116. as has been said, i qualify that it is advisable to claim only that the line God 
draws between prevented and non-prevented cases of animal suffering looks arbitrary at 
least to us human observers.
117. van inwaGen, «The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God», p. 220.
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4.4.  Pain and Death in a Stable organic World
Van inwagen does not speak at length about the necessary role of 
pain, suffering, and organic death in a world with stable natural laws and 
where conscious animals naturally evolve. But he does propose that this 
thesis is «true for all anyone knows». He suggests in an endnote the argu-
ments of Yancey and Brand in The Gift of Pain as support for the thesis that 
pain is a good of great value in such a world118.
The following is the basic general proposition (supported with ar-
guments from medical literature on the subject of pain): a regular pain 
mechanism is one of the most, if not the most, efficient means by which 
individual sentient animals (both irrational and rational) can be alerted 
against threats to their bodily integrity, against destructive random events 
in the natural world, and against potentially harmful conditions in their 
environment. We suggest that, in the absence of a plausible alternative, a 
regularly functioning pain mechanism might as well be one of the most 
efficient, if not the most efficient, means by which God brings about that 
both beasts and human beings normally preserve their organic bodily in-
tegrity in accordance with specific laws (e.g., particular laws associated 
with an animal’s membership in a specific species) in a regularly func-
tioning organic world.
Part of our argument is the claim that any other alternative – other 
than ubiquitous special interventions that necessarily bring about massive 
irregularity (whose negative consequences we have already exposed) – 
would either be not as efficient as pain, or else involves defects that are at 
least morally equivalent to whatever defects may be associated with there 
being a regularly functioning pain mechanism. if so, then any actualized 
state of affairs in which a regular pain mechanism makes possible the at-
tainment of the goods for which this mechanism is meant (see the basic 
general presupposition in the previous paragraph) would be at least morally 
equivalent to any other humanly conceivable alternative way by which God 
could have achieved those same goods. in the absence of a better alternative 
that we can conceive of, we humans cannot accuse God of moral imperfec-
tion or failure in omnipotence for bringing about a reliably regular pain 
mechanism.
118. van inwaGen, The Problem of Evil, p. 170, n. 12.
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4.4.1. Biologically Useful Pain119
a pain mechanism in a stable organic world would have the fol-
lowing characteristics: it must be reliably regular enough (like many other 
phenomena in that world) to be useful, and it must be efficient enough to 
maximize the probability of the achievement of the above-mentioned goods 
(see the general presupposition above).
Part of the good of the regularity of the pain mechanism in a regular 
world is that animal bodies have stable natural properties, i.e., they do not 
irregularly alternate between being vulnerable and being totally invulner-
able to pain. if there is some threat to the animal’s organic bodily integrity 
that calls for a particular type of instinctive or calculated response from 
the animal, pain sensations must be such that what they are indicating (e.g., 
tissue damage, need for nourishment, etc.) in a particular instance of pain 
would, as a matter of regularity, be the same as in more or less similar 
instances. The pain sensations must also be such that they maximize the 
probability of the animal’s making the appropriate responses.
in a regular world where a regular pain mechanism turns out to be 
(God not preventing this) the way by which animals preserve their organic 
bodily integrity, logically it is not better for animals to have total insensitiv-
ity to pain than for them to be regularly capable of pain sensations. in fact, 
total painlessness would be terrible for a sentient animal in that world.
one rare physiological disorder is a congenital insensitivity to pain 
which deprives the individual animal of a valuable biological warning sys-
tem possessed by most other animals of the same species. animals born 
with such a disorder bump into sharp objects, wound themselves, but hardly 
make any appropriate response in order to avoid further damage to their 
bodily integrity120. His work with leprosy patients convinced Dr. Brand of 
the horrifying consequences of a world without pain. He remarks:
life without pain is too dangerous... For the painless, danger lurks 
everywhere. a larynx that never feels a tickle does not trigger the cough 
119. in his discussion of the biological utility of pain and pleasure, Paul Draper 
makes use of the contrasting concepts of biologically useful pain (or pleasure) and bio-
logically gratuitous pain (or pleasure). according to Draper, pain is biologically useful 
when it a) causally contributes to one of the biological goals of an organic system (or 
to one of the biological goals of some other goal-directed organic system of which it 
is a part); and b) its doing so is not biologically accidental. Pain would be biologically 
gratuitous when it is not biologically useful (e.g., the pains of a terminal cancer patient 
just before he dies). See Paul draPer, «Pain and Pleasure: an Evidential Problem for 
Theists», Noûs 23, no. 3 (June 1989): pp. 334-335.
120. Philip yancey and Dr. Paul brand, The Gift of Pain (Grand rapids, mich.: 
zondervan Publishing House, 1997), pp. 3-5. See also hicK, Evil and the God of Love, 
pp. 297-298.
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reflex that relocates phlegm from the lungs to the pharynx, and a person 
who never coughs runs the risk of developing pneumonia. The bone joints 
of insensitive people deteriorate because there are no whispers of pain en-
couraging a shift in position, and soon bone grinds against bone121.
Yancey and Brand describe the normal functioning of the pain 
mechanism in terms of the language-of-pain metaphor.
Pain employs a wide tonal range of conversation. it whispers to us 
in the early stages: at a subconscious level we sense a slight discomfort and 
change positions in bed, or adjust a jogging stride. it speaks louder as danger 
increases: a hand grows tender after a long stint at raking leaves, or a foot 
grows sore in new shoes. and pain shouts when the danger becomes severe: it 
forces a person to limp or even to hop or else quit running altogether122.
The above description can of course be applied to irrational animals 
instinctively adjusting their body movements in response to the stimulus 
that pain gives, thus protecting their bodily integrity.
Sometimes, though, when the brain is occupied with many other ac-
tivities, the pain sensation does not register right away. Soldiers in battle, 
athletes at play, or animals fighting over a carcass may not immediately 
sense their injuries while the action is going on. religious ecstasy (as in the 
case of martyrs), hypnotism, placebos, an abnormal masochistic state of 
mind, as well as «one’s conscious interpretation of the significance of the 
pain that one feels is also important», have also been known to minimize 
the pain experience. in other words, in these cases the pain is sensed but 
the emotional response to it (namely, suffering) is diminished or put off123. 
Here’s Dr. Brand’s description of how the pain mechanism works
i divide the experience of pain into three stages. First there is the 
pain signal, an alarm that goes off when nerve endings in the periphery 
sense danger...
at a second stage of pain, the spinal cord and base of the brain act as 
a «spinal gate» to sort out which of the many millions of signals deserve to 
be forwarded as a message to the brain. Damage or disease may sometimes 
interfere: if the spinal cord is severed, as in paraplegia, peripheral nerve 
endings below the break may continue to discharge pain signals, but those 
signals will not reach the brain.
The final stage of pain takes place in the higher brain (especially the 
cerebral cortex), which sorts through the prescreened messages and decides 
121. yancey and brand, The Gift of Pain, pp. 185-186.
122. Ibid., p. 176.
123. hicK, Evil and the God of Love, pp. 294-297. See the literature on pain that 
Hick refers to on pp. 294-302.
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on a response. indeed, pain does not truly exist until the entire cycle of sig-
nal, message, response has been completed124.
a regular pain mechanism thus serves as a reliable indicator that an-
nounces that something is wrong when the injury has just begun, i.e., before 
serious injury sets in. The pain mechanism in effect «advises» the animal 
against further injury by forcing the animal either to withdraw or to struggle 
to remove the source of the injury. a high-tech thermograph is a poor sub-
stitute for a healthy pain mechanism, since this device detects a problem 
only after the fact, not before, and usually when it is too late to do some-
thing. «The beauty of pain is that it lets you know right away when you are 
harming yourself».125 This is true at least in cases involving what Hick calls 
«the primary function of pain», namely, «the healthy animal’s management 
of itself within the external environment»126. instances of biologically gra-
tuitous pain – e.g., ones that serve no self-preserving purpose anymore since 
the animal is terminally ill anyway or is going to die anyway (cfr. rowe’s 
fawn) – present a special difficulty and will be addressed shortly.
a regular pain mechanism also protects in advance. a fawn that be-
gins to sense an uncomfortable increase in temperature as it comes too close 
to a forest fire instinctively withdraws and avoids getting burned. among 
higher-level sentient animals (e.g., rational animals), the higher brain is in-
volved in the experience of pain. The memory stores the unpleasantness of 
the pain experience, thus protecting the animal in the future127.
most people and most irrational animals display aversion to pain 
sensations. But that is precisely part of pain’s efficiency. it must be unpleas-
ant. it must persist while the danger is still there. it must hurt sufficiently 
to maximize the probability of the animals’ doing something right now 
(whether by reason or by instinct) to survive the threats to their physical 
integrity128. as Yancey and Brand put it, a normally functioning pain system 
is not the enemy, but the loyal messenger announcing the enemy. it would be 
dangerous indeed for animals to regard pain as an enemy. (Human animals 
are often inclined to regarding pain as an enemy.) «once regarded as an 
enemy, not a warning signal, pain loses its power to instruct. Silencing pain 
without considering its message is like disconnecting a ringing fire alarm 
to avoid receiving bad news»129.
124. yancey and brand, The Gift of Pain, pp. 201-202.
125. Ibid., p. 166.
126. hicK, Evil and the God of Love, pp. 300-301 (italics added).
127. yancey and brand, The Gift of Pain, pp. 121-122, 216-217.
128. Ibid., pp. 177, 217-218.
129. Ibid., p. 188.
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Pain sends a signal not only to the individual animal but also to the 
larger group of which the individual is a member130. Through the external 
manifestations, an individual’s pain sends a message to the rest in the group 
that a certain organic state is pain-producing. Consequently, there must be 
something wrong with it and something must be done: remove the cause of 
the tissue damage of which the pain is the signal, rescue the individual from 
the painful situation, do something so as not to have a similar situation in 
the future, etc. oftentimes, expressions of human suffering are in effect 
pleas for communal help. among irrational animals, appropriate responses 
may be no more than the instinctive protection of one by another, as exem-
plified by a mother hen that wards off a puppy threatening to harm her baby 
chicks. instinctive memory of past pain-producing attacks has of course 
made possible the development of this motherly instinct for protecting the 
young. The probability of learning such basic procedures of preserving the 
self131 or some other member of the species could only have been maximized 
by pain. The maximizing factors for this habit-formation would be pain’s 
reliable regularity, persistence, and intensity.
Finally, Yancey and Brand suggest that one of the greatest goods that 
a regular pain mechanism makes possible is the freedom to explore life.
The freedom to explore life is one of pain’s greatest gifts... i am free 
to walk barefoot across rock-strewn ground, to drink coffee out of a tip cup, 
and to turn a screwdriver with all my strength, because i can trust my pain 
signals to alert me whenever i approach the danger point132.
Non-rational animals, of course, may not exactly have the kind of 
«freedom to explore life» that human beings enjoy. But it is at least plausible 
to claim that there is some intrinsic good in a state of affairs where irrational 
animals are able to move about and «play around» in a stable natural world 
and a reliably regular pain mechanism alerts them of dangers, stimulating 
them to make instinctive adjustments that preserve their physical integrity.
Since ubiquitous divine miracles bring about the defect of massive 
irregularity, it seems that God is justified in giving sentient animals (both 
rational and irrational) a pain mechanism that is biologically useful for indi-
vidual animals partly on account of its reliable regularity and its efficiency. 
Unless, therefore, there is some other alternative that we have good reason 
to believe is morally preferable (i.e., not only morally equivalent) to a regu-
130. Cfr. ibid., p. 21.
131. For lack of a better term, when i say «preserving the self», i mean to include 
not only the self-preserving actions of rational animals, who have a consciousness of 
themselves, but also those of irrational animals that, properly speaking, may not have 
«selves», at least not in the way that rational animals do. 
132. yancey and brand, The Gift of Pain, p. 230.
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lar pain mechanism, i propose that God’s equipment of the organic world 
with a regular pain mechanism is indeed morally justified.
Now, what about particular instances of biologically gratuitous 
pain?
4.4.2. Biologically Gratuitous Pain
if the primary function God attaches to pain in a stable world is 
alerting animals against threats to their bodily integrity, against destruc-
tive random events in the natural world, and against potentially harmful 
conditions in their environment so that they can make the appropriate self-
preserving adjustments, why doesn’t God prevent individual cases of bio-
logically gratuitous pain, e.g., the pains of a terminally ill animal, or the 
pains of a fawn as it burns to death in a forest fire? i think part of the answer 
lies in God’s good reasons for keeping the regularity of the world.
a regularly functioning pain mechanism, says John Perry, is like a 
car alarm that signals theft but also sounds off when no theft is occurring, 
as when some innocent child comes too close to the car and touches it out 
of curiosity. The regular functioning of the car alarm mechanism makes it 
reliable in signaling theft. many people may be irritated by the unpleasant 
sound of the alarm and would rather prefer cars that do not have alarms. 
But the car alarm inventors are justified in that the good of discouraging 
car theft is worth all the unpleasant sounds of car alarms that, as a conse-
quence of their regular functioning, go off even at times when no theft is 
occurring.
moreover, all the wailing and all the pains of a dying animal are like 
the unpleasant sounds of «a car alarm that is uselessly set off, by an explo-
sion that has pretty much destroyed the car anyway»133. The car alarm in this 
case no longer serves the purpose of preserving this particular car. and yet, 
that alarms in general should be regular in sounding off is probably neces-
sary to make possible the general good of discouraging car theft.
Similarly, in a regular world, fire must hurt – as a matter of regular-
ity – as it burns animal flesh, whether the animal manages to escape from 
the fire and so is only slightly burned, or the animal fails to escape and so is 
burned to death. a wound brought about by a random event in nature must 
hurt whether or not it eventually leads to death. That this ought to be so in-
creases the probability of the animal’s reacting (instinctively or rationally) 
in ways that maximize its chances of survival.
133. John Perry, Dialogue on Good, Evil, and the Existence of God (indianapolis: 
Hackett Pub., 1999), pp. 62-64.
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and there is also some intrinsic good in the following state of af-
fairs: God communicates ad extra his causal powers to some creatures. 
That means, in the case of rational animals, that even if God is the First 
and Principal Cause, rational animals are truly made to participate in God’s 
causal powers134. God is fully the cause of some creaturely operation – inas-
much as every creaturely operation presupposes the creature’s act of being, 
which participates in God (Pure act) – even as rational creatures moving 
about in a stable natural world are also fully the causes of the same op-
eration. There is, however, no contradiction in saying that God is the total 
cause of something even if He is not the exclusive cause of this thing135. 
For our purposes, this point implies that in a given case of, say, a severe 
wound brought about by a random event in nature, the individual human 
being in pain and/or those around him are truly able to do something – e.g., 
to treat the wound, to give and receive help – and thus the survival of the 
suffering individual is truly caused by the rational creature/s. or, rational 
creatures could remain indifferent and thus the individual bleeds to death 
from the wound that, in a regular world, wouldn’t have led to death. in the 
latter case, there is indeed some truth in saying that the human decision not 
to do anything when something could have been done caused the death of 
the individual.
The regular functioning of the pain mechanism therefore increases 
the probability of this good: individual and communal action to eliminate 
unnecessary pain and suffering (whenever it is prudent to do so) and to 
make it more bearable and meaningful especially when it is no longer bio-
logically useful for the individual sufferer.
Some free-will responses to the problem of evil would, of course, 
include many other goods that a general state of affairs where God allows 
individual cases of biologically gratuitous pain is supposed to make pos-
sible (e.g., an individual sufferer’s sharing in the divine work of atonement, 
soul-formation, greater perfection through suffering, being-of-use, etc.). For 
the general achievement of all these proposed goods, i suggest that it is 
vague (at least to us) how many instances of biologically gratuitous pain 
God must allow so that these goods would not be forfeited. This vagueness 
should be enough for any human not to dare accuse God of moral imperfec-
134. Cfr. Summa Theologica, part i, q. 83, a. 1, ad 3. «But it does not of necessity 
belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one 
thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, 
Who moves causes both natural and voluntary... [B]y moving voluntary causes He does 
not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is he the cause of this very thing 
in them; for he operates in each thing according to its own nature».
135. Ángel luis González, Teología natural, 5ª edición corregida (Pamplona: 
EUNSa, 2005), pp. 241-244.
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tion or failure in omnipotence for permitting individual cases of biologi-
cally gratuitous pain.
i emphasize that ensuring the regularity of the pain mechanism as 
a general policy may not be God’s only reason for allowing some instances 
of human animal pain. (That keeping such regularity cannot be the reason 
for a specific episode of human animal pain is obvious from the plausible 
supposition that if this particular human pain had suddenly been miracu-
lously eliminated, the pain mechanism in the organic world wouldn’t have 
suddenly become massively irregular.) Sometimes, God may indeed have 
special reasons which He attaches only to this specific pain episode and not 
to others of the same sort (e.g., only by this pain can this particular man be 
converted, and significantly perfected spiritually; only by this terminal can-
cer pains can this patient achieve the good of participating in the redemptive 
work of God, etc.). Sometimes this special reason becomes clearly known 
while the pain is being sensed, sometimes only hinted at, sometimes known 
only in retrospect or sometimes not at all by the sufferer or by any human 
observer.
But the point in the anti-irregularity defense is that even in cases 1) 
where a special reason exclusive to a particular episode of pain/suffering is 
truly absent (even from God’s point of view); and 2) where this particular 
pain episode could indeed have been prevented by God without loss of the 
general good of regularity of the pain mechanism (as, logically, any par-
ticular episode could be), God would still have been sufficiently justified 
already against human criticism just by the following: a) He must allow a 
certain amount of pain to keep the regularity of the pain mechanism; and b) 
nobody (not human beings certainly) can pinpoint a minimum total number 
of pain episodes necessary in order for there to be a reliable pain mecha-
nism and in order to avoid massive irregularity in the pain mechanism.
of course, if God is sufficiently justified already against any human 
criticism in the way proposed by the anti-irregularity defense, there is no 
preventing a theist who wants to add the following: From any particular 
episode of a biologically gratuitous pain sensation, God always can (and 
indeed sometimes does) draw some particular goods of great intrinsic 
value136. But it wouldn’t matter to the anti-irregularity defender whether 
136. To say, of course, that only this particular pain episode could have made pos-
sible the achievement of this particular good of great value (e.g., St. Therese’s having a 
chance at participating in the redemptive work of God by this particular suffering, the one 
she had as she was dying of tuberculosis) presupposes the distinction between the dying 
patient’s biologically gratuitous pain sensations that by themselves may be without spiri-
tual value, and the whole «tribulational system» (cfr. lewis, The Problem of Pain, pp. 
84-85) occasioned by the pain sensations and that includes, in the case of this patient, the 
emotional response of suffering lovingly offered to God. There is, therefore, some sense 
in saying that this particular good («the suffering of great redemptive value, occasioned 
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these goods could have been achieved only by the particular pain episode 
or they were also achievable by other means. For even if these goods where 
achievable only by the particular pain episode, the anti-irregularity defender 
does not avail of this supposed fact. (indeed, God’s making possible the 
achievement of certain goods so that a particular person may then be enabled 
to freely will these goods cannot, logically, ensure this particular person’s 
actual free cooperation in the achievement of these goods. But again, the 
anti-irregularity defender does not need to be reminded of this, since he has 
no need of this line of defense, for whatever it is worth.)
indeed, it would not count against the anti-irregularity defense that 
some, or even all, instances of biologically gratuitous pain are turned by 
God into occasions for the achievement of other (non-biological) goods of 
great value. But the anti-irregularity defense against the local argument 
from evil would always warn the theist against employing any of these 
goods as the sufficiently justifying reason for God’s permission of a par-
ticular instance of biologically gratuitous pain.
conclUsion
We now gather together in one stretch the general conclusions we 
have reached from our study.
First, we have shown that theism has not been successfully dem-
onstrated to be false by any of the arguments from evil so far employed 
by atheists. The relevant terms (e.g., «evil» and «God») were made clear 
and agreeable to all parties in the discussion – whether theist, atheist, or 
agnostic. although van inwagen simply equates «evils» with «countable 
bad things», we tried to explore the richness of the traditional definition of 
«evil» as privatio boni.
CoNClUSioN (1) Evil is «the absence of some good or perfection 
that, according to a system of evaluation that one takes to be objective and 
universal, ought to be present».
This description of evil emphasizes both the objective and the sub-
jective elements of evil. When people judge some state of affairs to be in-
volving some evil, they agree as judging subjects that some objective or-
der of goodness is violated. Thus, evils are not just matters of perspective 
or personal taste, and so they should be distinguished from the subjective 
aversion to the states of affairs involving them. The statement that «evil ex-
by tuberculosis and lovingly offered by St. Therese») couldn’t have been achieved if God 
miraculously prevented all of St. Therese’s pain sensations. 
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ists» simply means there really are cases of privations of good in the actual 
world.
The term «God» has also been clarified for all parties in the discus-
sion. God is «something than which a greater cannot be conceived» and, as 
such, He is, among other things, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally 
perfect Person who created the universe. any alternative conceptions of 
«evil» or «God» (e.g., a less-than-omnipotent God, an impersonal God, a 
God in process, etc.) radically transforms the problem so that it is no longer 
the problem of evil as traditionally posed in Western religious and intel-
lectual history.
Second, we have highlighted van inwagen’s appeal to an incompati-
bilist theory of free-will as at least «probably true». This suggests at least 
the probability that:
CoNClUSioN (2) it is metaphysically impossible for God to en-
sure that no moral evil gets done in a world where He allows free creatures 
to significantly exercise the freedom necessary for creaturely love and com-
munion.
The actual commission of moral evils has never been a part of God’s 
eternal plan. We have also shown that if the world could have been much 
worse than it actually is, then it is at least possible that God does everything 
His omnipotence could do to increase the probability that His free creatures 
would freely choose to do the good. However, despite all that omnipotence 
can do, the free creature remains in a very real sense actually able to turn 
against God, against his fellow humans, against the world, and against his 
own reason and self-integrity. But God does not eliminate creaturely free-
dom because of its necessity in making possible the immensely great good 
of the creature called out of nothingness to come to love God (and his fel-
low creatures and himself in God). Creaturely freedom is thus a necessary 
element in God’s plan to call to personal communion those whom He first 
called out of nothingness.
Third, our study has also shown that a world/universe designed to be 
the eventual dwelling place, even if only temporarily, of free human beings 
intended by God to be capable of loving and being loved, would have to be 
regular. it must have fixed stable laws and regularity of sequence. We have 
argued that this regularity is probably necessary as God guided the evolu-
tion of the world (and all organisms in it) towards becoming the most fitting 
home, even if only temporarily, of the first human free beings (as having 
intrinsic worth distinct from those of angelic free beings). massive irregu-
larity would have made impossible the natural evolution of the higher-level 
sentient beings that would in turn be the immediate evolutionary predeces-
sors of human beings made in the image and likeness of God. Hence:
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CoNClUSioN (3) it would be metaphysically impossible for God 
to ensure a regular world destined to be entrusted to the stewardship of 
human free beings, without allowing for the possibility that there would 
be some extra-lapsarian evils in that world (e.g., animal pain and, possibly, 
animal suffering).
Fourth, moving beyond what van inwagen argues in his anti-irregu-
larity defense, i incorporated the insights of natural-law theodicies. i have 
shown that once the existence of human free beings was already actual-
ized in the world, the regularity of that world had to be maintained for the 
significant exercise of freedom. God’s constant miraculous interventions 
to prevent the commission of any moral evil and the feeling of any pain or 
suffering resulting from the abuse of free will and from man’s unimpeded 
interaction with different natures (living and non-living material bodies) 
would have made the world a «hedonic paradise». But it would have been a 
massively irregular world where no significant moral good could be done, 
where no genuine love could develop, and consequently no personal com-
munion could take place. But this would be contrary to God’s original plan 
for His creation in general and for man in particular.
Clearly then, unalloyed pleasure and the total absence of pain and 
suffering at the cost of personal growth in love and communion is not the 
supreme value in this world. Growth and perfection in love and ultimately 
communion with God is. God actualized the necessary, though insufficient, 
conditions for this good of great value to be made possible. He created a 
world in statu viae («state of journeying») and eventually entrusted it to the 
care of humans, who themselves are images of God in statu viae. man is a 
homo viator who journeys to greater states of perfection in the context of 
a regular material universe where he encounters and establishes personal 
communion with his fellows and with God. The world, with its fixed laws 
and regularity of sequence, is the arena for personal communion. There-
fore:
CoNClUSioN (4) it is metaphysically impossible for God to en-
sure that there would be no evils that could potentially result from random 
events in a material world whose fixed laws and regularity of sequence God 
preserves as a necessary condition for the significant exercise of creaturely 
freedom and love.
Fifth, part of the divine entrustment of the world to the care and 
stewardship of humans is God’s communication of His causal and actu-
alizing powers to humans. God enabled humans to significantly develop 
the world in their own creative ways in accordance with what they would 
progressively discover to be God’s will and God’s plan for the world. This 
power to do so much good logically involves the possibility of its being 
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misused to do so much evil. The inherited consequences of the primordial 
abuses of free will have compounded the difficulty since, given the fall of 
man from an original state of holiness and justice, growth and perfection 
in love has now become even more arduous. Thus, God reactively decreed 
to provide a necessary condition for fallen man’s growth and perfection in 
love. Therefore:
CoNClUSioN (5) Besides all the things that Christian revelation 
says God has done and continues to do to redeem His fallen creatures (e.g., 
incarnation and the Paschal mystery, perfection of the imago Dei through 
transformation into the imago Christi), it is now (i.e., given the contingent 
event of creatures abusing their freedom) metaphysically impossible for 
God to bring to completion His plan to call creatures to eternal commu-
nion with Him without leaving in place some amount of evil and randomly 
distributed suffering that are the natural consequences of the primordial 
as well as the subsequent abuses of creaturely freedom.
and, of course, this non-total cancellation of the natural results of 
our rebellion (plausibly, God does spare us from a lot of evil that otherwise 
would have obtained!) is not necessarily taken as punishment in the sense of 
a vengeful God unleashing His fury on erring humans without any thought 
of these creatures’ highest good. it is rather seen as a logical consequence 
of God’s non-deception to His creatures in regard to their true state after the 
primordial abuse of freedom. This non-deception is in turn necessary for 
the growth and perfection in love of creatures who have inherited the imago 
Dei now impaired and disfigured, though not destroyed by sin.
Sixth, in the context of merely justifying God’s ways before human 
criticism, i have shown that an appeal to the phenomenon of vagueness 
sufficiently casts reasonable doubt on the atheist’s allegations. Vagueness 
characterizes many of the states of affairs appealed to by the atheist in her 
local arguments. For example:
(a) The minimum amount of «metaphysical evils» [essential onto-
logical limitations that are of course not evil in the sense of CoNClUSioN 
(1) above] necessary for the good of a world in statu viae is vague at least 
to human beings;
(b) The minimum amount of God’s non-preventions of «such-moral-
evils-as-an-individual-person-may-actually-commit-in-his-lifetime» neces-
sary for God’s preserving this person’s significant exercise of freedom is 
vague at least to human beings;
(c) The minimum amount of God’s non-preventions of «such-mor-
al-evils-as-may-be-actually-committed-by-human-beings» necessary for 
God’s preserving the good of the significant exercise of creaturely freedom 
is vague at least to human beings;
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(d) The minimum amount of God’s non-preventions of «such-ex-
tra-lapsarian-evils-as-there-may-actually-obtain-by-chance» necessary for 
God’s preserving the regularity of a world eventually entrusted to the stew-
ardship of human beings for the sake of personal communion is vague at 
least to human beings. Therefore:
CoNClUSioN (6): Given evil’s vague necessity (or non-necessity) 
for goods of great enough value, no particular instance of either a lapsar-
ian or an extra-lapsarian evil can be used by a human being to successfully 
argue against the non-existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-
loving God.
lastly, i note that a mere theoretical justification of God’s ways be-
fore human criticism is inadequate to address all the existential problems 
and the anguished cries of suffering individuals. But i hasten to add that 
this inadequacy is a result of two things. First, a project that merely defends 
God’s reputation as beyond moral reproach does not in fact make positive 
assertions about what else such a God does for His people besides fulfill His 
supposed moral obligations to them. Secondly, suffering individuals are not 
primarily searching for (or at least do not stop at) mere intellectual dem-
onstrations of God’s moral blamelessness. at the heart of every anguished 
lament, every sigh of frustration, and every cry of desperation is the plea for 
assurance that it still makes sense to live on, that one can count on the un-
derstanding, empathy, acceptance, and help of others, and, especially, that 
one is loved (by God through the events in one’s life) and that therefore there 
is hope that all will be well in the end.
Thus, instead of limiting ourselves to a fruitless search for «goods» 
with logically necessary connections to every suffering, i suggest a «mov-
ing on» to a theodicy that uses the resources of Christian revelation and tries 
to make sense of evils in the context of God’s calling the human person to 
participate in His intimate life as abounding love.
The theological and existential limits of a philosophical reflection 
on evil have always been acknowledged by theistic defenders.137 We, too, 
humbly acknowledge these limitations. and, of course, a Christian philoso-
pher who sincerely searches for the answers to the ultimate questions takes 
it very seriously that certain truths are beyond the reach of unaided human 
reason. and so, he looks up to another source of truth. The self-revelation 
of God, Christ the Way, the Truth, and the life has taught us this truth: God 
Himself freely suffered and died for love. From this great paschal mystery 
of Christ’s Passion, Death, and resurrection, there came about the great 
137. conesa, Dios y el mal, pp. 441-443.
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good of human nature being enabled again to enter into communion with 
God and with one another in God.
in the end, a theodicy would have to acknowledge the lesson of the 
Cross. if even Christ the God-man freely embraced suffering and death 
for the sake of love, thereby conquering sin and eternal death, and is now 
gloriously triumphant, then God has taught us that the supreme value in this 
world is not the total avoidance of all pain and suffering but the love that 
overcomes evils, abounds in the face of evils, and ultimately leads to life 
in Christ.
indeed, where sin and evils abound, love abounds all the more!
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